

# bulletin

VOL. XXV, No. 42

October 17, 1957



## THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARABIAN DESERTS

by John H. Johnson, Under Secretary of State

939

940

941

942

## THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARABIAN DESERTS

943

## THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARABIAN DESERTS

944

945

## THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARABIAN DESERTS

946

947



# *The Department of State* bulletin

VOL. XXV, No. 651 • PUBLICATION 4437

December 17, 1951

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25  
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (July 29, 1949).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

## Science and Foreign Policy

by Walter Rudolph

Only a few years ago scientists and engineers seemed to have had little in common with Government officials concerned with policy making. Today, however, they have a widening area of mutual interest. In the realm of foreign relations, this interaction between science and government policy finds expression in the recent establishment of the Office of the Science Adviser in the Department of State and of science staffs in the Foreign Service.

Actually, this relation between scientists and government is not new. In 1863 President Lincoln urged the Congress to charter the National Academy of Sciences and asked its members to serve the Government during the war in an advisory and consultative capacity. At the request of President Wilson, the Academy created the National Research Council in 1916 to cooperate with scientific societies and to advise the Government on the scientific aspects of our preparedness program. Again in 1941, President Roosevelt established the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) to carry on and coordinate a research program as an important adjunct to our military operations during World War II. Each of these organizations, created out of conditions of war, consisted of the country's foremost scientists and engineers. The Academy and Council, continuing as private bodies since their beginnings, have served the Government upon request on many occasions, especially since World War I. The Office of Scientific Research and Development, however, was liquidated as a Government agency after the last war.

The new feature of this science-government relationship consisted of an awareness during and after World War II of the importance of science as a continuing element of national policy. This awareness was exemplified in 1947 in the creation by the Congress of the Research and Development Board which was charged with preparing a unified and integrated program of military research and development. It was also exemplified in President Roosevelt's request that Dr. Vannevar

Bush, who had eminently piloted the wartime OSRD, recommend a plan for bringing science and technology into close, permanent relations with the Government.

Following Dr. Bush's suggestions in his report *Science, The Endless Frontier* (1945), President Truman directed that a further study be made of this matter. The result was a report, *Science and Public Policy*, prepared in 1947 by the President's Scientific Research Board, which set out certain proposals on the special role the Government could play in helping to achieve a balanced and more effective science program for the nation.

In emphasizing the international aspects of this program, one section of the report was devoted to the operations during the war of temporary scientific missions sponsored by the United States and by other governments. Recognizing the accomplishments of such groups and noting the Department's plans for overseas science activities described below, the Board recommended that "appropriate development of this kind of scientific foreign service be considered an essential part of the national science program."

### Background of the Department's Science Program

The Department's science program stemmed from the experience of these and other wartime missions, from experimentation, and from a comprehensive study of the Department's responsibilities in international science.

### WAR AND POSTWAR INFORMATION COLLECTION

During the war the United States established a Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee (TIIC) as an affiliate of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This Committee sent technical teams, mainly to Germany, to seize enemy scientific and technical data. The U.S. teams joined in these efforts with corresponding British technical teams. Reports, based on those seized materials trans-

mitted to this country, were made available to various U.S. military research and civilian production programs.

After the war (1946) the U.S. Mission for the Exchange of Industrial Technology (MEIT) was assigned responsibility for arranging with Great Britain exchanges of information obtained in the TUC program. This mission, composed of technicians, was established with Department of Commerce funds and directed by that Department. When Ambassador W. Averell Harriman returned from London to become Secretary of Commerce in the latter part of 1946, he requested the Secretary of State to take over the responsibilities of MEIT in the belief that international exchange of this type of information was more logically a function of the Department of State.

#### PEACETIME INFORMATION EXCHANGE

Meanwhile, the matter of liaison with British Government agencies concerning the peacetime exchange of scientific and industrial information was being explored jointly by the Department of Commerce and the Department of State. As a result of this study, it was recommended that the Department of State assume administrative responsibility for MEIT and that the mission orient its work toward facilitating the exchange of a wide variety of scientific and technological information between the United States and Great Britain.

#### PLANS FOR THE LONDON STAFF

The Department of State assigned responsibility for this project, to be carried out on an experimental basis, to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. Before the experiment at London was tried out, however, scientists in and outside the Government were called upon for their advice. They proposed a fundamental departure from the composition and functions of the MEIT. Briefly, they made the following recommendations: (1) scientists should compose the group and should be concerned primarily with the promotion of interchange of unclassified scientific information particularly in the natural sciences; (2) members should be active research scientists rather than administrative scientists; (3) the group should be set up as a permanent staff of the Embassy; (4) membership of the staff, however, should be rotating; and (5) the products of the staff should be made as widely available as possible to American scientists. These recommendations were accepted and incorporated into the plans for the Department's project.

*The London Experiment.* In 1947, therefore, the Department of State introduced an innovation in the Foreign Service. The London science staff was authorized by an arrangement between the Director General of Foreign Service and the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. Under

this arrangement a small staff was established as an integral part of the Embassy, financed by the Foreign Service and administered by the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. Since its beginning, the staff has consisted of more than a dozen scientists who served for periods ranging from a few months to 2 years. They have represented chemistry, biology, medicine, and engineering.

Precedents, of course, had existed for the idea of a continuing scheme for international scientific exchange. The British Commonwealth Scientific Office, in operation during the war, was continued after the war. The Office of Naval Research in London was organized in 1946 and carried on where the OSRD left off by maintaining a staff of scientists in London. This staff has made, and continues to make, significant contributions to the exchange of scientific information not only between this country and Great Britain but also between this country and Western Europe.

*Evaluation of the Experiment.* The establishment of this experimental staff was significant because it constituted a step in the thinking in the Department about its responsibilities in international science. For the first time, reporting on scientific and technical matters, as such, was looked upon as a legitimate function of the Foreign Service and was regarded as an activity similar to that of reporting on political and economic matters. As the work of the London science staff developed, it became clear to those concerned with the experiment that if scientists on the staff were to function effectively they had to promote international cooperation in science, and they had to do so in ways beyond mere reporting. The experiment pointed up the facts also that there were occasions when scientific factors impinged upon international affairs and that the Department had no adequate machinery for bringing these factors to bear on the discharge of its responsibilities. In sum, the experiment at London demonstrated to those intimately concerned with it that the Department should be more aware than it apparently was of its responsibilities in international science and that mechanisms in additional missions, like the London science staff, might be important cogs in an organization for discharging these responsibilities.

#### DEPARTMENT SURVEY

Consequently, when the Department carried out its reorganization in 1949, it called in as a consultant to the Secretary, Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, then a staff member of the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism, Carnegie Institution of Washington, and now president of the Associated Universities, Inc. It asked him to survey the basic problems in international relations raised by scientific and technical developments, to examine the principal activities of the Department affected by



these problems, and to make recommendations in organization which would, if put into effect, enable the Department to meet effectively its responsibilities in the scientific and technical aspects of foreign relations. The results of this study were expressed in a Department report, *Science and Foreign Relations*, issued in May 1950.<sup>1</sup>

### The Science Program

#### The survey noted

... the increasing impact of science and technology on foreign affairs as well as the profound effect the administration of foreign relations has upon the progress of science and technology.

It accordingly raised two basic questions: (1) How can the potentialities of scientific progress be integrated into the formulation of foreign policy and the administration of foreign relations? (2) How can foreign relations be conducted to create an atmosphere conducive to scientific progress?

In the search for answers to these queries, the activities of the Department relating to science and technology were looked into. Similar activities carried on by other departments and agencies of the Government were examined. Inquiries were made concerning private science programs. On the basis of these studies, and with the advice of a large number of interested critics in and outside the Department, a guiding conclusion was drawn.

This conclusion was that the objectives inherent in these questions could be achieved if the Department would manifest a positive interest in international science matters and actively cooperate with scientists by making available its skill in international procedures and relations. Two rather new types of Department activities, according to the survey, would be helpful in pursuing this course. One of these consisted of integrating within the Department considerations concerning science and technology with political, economic, legal, public affairs, and other considerations in formulating foreign policy. The other consisted of developing closer relations between the Department and private scientists, their organizations, and their international programs.

Creation of a small organization in the Department and development of good working relations with Government and private agencies were considered to be requisites for carrying out these activities. If these essentials could be met, it was contended, a scheme could be developed in which issues relating to scientific aspects of policy and programs could come to the attention of officers who could then collaborate in interpreting these issues, analyzing them, deriving conclusions, reaching decisions, and making recommendations. By

such an organization and process, it was believed, progress could be made in bringing scientific and technological matters to bear on foreign relations and in helping to conduct foreign relations for the advancement of science in the United States.

### THE SCIENCE PROGRAM ORGANIZATION

In accordance with the recommendations of the report, *Science and Foreign Relations*, the Office of the Science Adviser was established last February in the Department "directly under and responsible to the Under Secretary of State, since the Office of the Under Secretary is responsible for Department-wide coordinating of policy formulation and administration." A small staff composed mainly of scientists helps the science adviser discharge his responsibilities for advising on the scientific and technological aspects of foreign policy and programs.

Science staffs established in the Foreign Service and operating in certain of our missions abroad assist the science adviser. At present, these staffs are set up at London, Stockholm, and Bern. The London staff, which, as indicated before, has been in operation since 1947, has been augmented and at present consists of three scientists. The Stockholm and Bern staffs, established last July, each have two scientists.

In order that a wide range of scientific and technical fields may be represented, the science adviser is assisted by other scientists in this country. Direct communications have been established between the Office of the Science Adviser and scientists and technical experts in Government agencies engaged in scientific research and development. Also, through the National Research Council, formal and continuing communications have been set up with scientists in various universities and laboratories over the country. The Council, with its nine divisions, has facilities for drawing upon the competence of the total scientific and engineering population of the nation. Many of these specialists are members of more than a hundred scientific and professional organizations affiliated with the Council.

Finally, the science adviser is assisted by appropriate members of the National Academy of Sciences who stand ready to furnish counsel on top-level scientific policy questions when requested to do so.

### THE SCIENCE PROGRAM OPERATION

The Office of the Science Adviser and the science staffs are established in the Department and the Foreign Service respectively. These locations are based on the report's recommendation that matters relating to international science and technology should be brought directly into the context of foreign policy rather than indirectly.

<sup>1</sup>For text of *Science and Foreign Relations*, see Department of State publication 3860.

## THE OFFICE OF THE SCIENCE ADVISER

Effective working relations have been developed between the Office of the Science Adviser and other units of the Department, such as those concerned with the exchange of information, the exchange of persons, passports and visas, and the political and economic affairs of foreign countries. Issues with which the Department is concerned usually are complex, with many facets to be considered before solutions can be reached. On many occasions, the Office of the Science Adviser calls upon other units of the Department or is requested by them to collaborate in arriving at a rounded-out Departmental position. Whenever these issues are predominantly scientific or technical in nature and require high-level consideration, the science adviser brings them to the attention of the Under Secretary.

Often the activities of the Office of the Science Adviser require collaboration with other agencies. For example, a foreign request channeled through a science attaché to look into the possibilities of a new process for recovering sulphur from coal gas necessitates consultations with officers of other Government departments concerned with its scientific and technical potentialities and its possible effects on production here and abroad. The Office sometimes is helpful to American scientific interests. It may, for example, direct one of its science attachés to assist in making sure that cortisone donated by a United States source be distributed to those foreign laboratories where further scientific study would be most fruitful. Frequently, the Office can save manpower and money by meeting from local sources a domestic request for information, such as that on processes for recovering germanium from coal, instead of having science attachés duplicate the effort by acquiring the information from foreign government and private agencies.

None of the activities of the Office is intended to duplicate, conflict, or displace science activities carried on by other units of the Government or by private sources. The program is intended to function in a facilitating and advisory capacity rather than in an operating capacity. Responsibility for actions on scientific and technological issues in foreign affairs remains with existing units of the Department.

## SCIENCE STAFFS

The science staffs are patterned largely after the experimental science staff at London. In general, therefore, each science staff includes two or three scientists appointed as Foreign Service Reserve officers and given the diplomatic status of attachés. Candidates for these positions normally are drawn from universities and laboratories for periods ranging from 15 months to 3 years. Usually, the senior attaché in a mission serves for 15 months and the other attachés for longer

periods. The attachés, representing various fields in the natural sciences and engineering, carry out overseas operations to help the science adviser at Washington discharge his responsibilities for advising on the science aspects of foreign policy. Consequently, men attracted to these posts are usually mature men eminent in their fields, with linguistic abilities and with experience in foreign countries; they are men who are willing to devote a year or more to this work and are able to resume their regular work at the university or laboratory after their assignment abroad.

Although the science program is a regular and continuing activity of the Foreign Service, and the science staffs are an integral and permanent element of our missions, membership on these staffs is temporary and rotating. This arrangement facilitates obtaining the services of high-caliber men whose qualifications have been described. Continuity of the work of the science staffs is maintained by appointment of some of the science attachés for periods longer than 15 months. It is also maintained by overlapping tenures of science attachés.

## STAFF ACTIVITIES

Reporting on scientific matters abroad constitutes a main function of these staffs. This activity cannot adequately be carried out except in the context of mutual confidence and understanding between the science attachés and foreign scientists. Therefore, this function must be characterized as the promotion of a two-way flow of scientific information.

Much technological information is reported by other Foreign Service officers and by the military attachés. Consequently, the special province of science attachés consists chiefly of reporting on developments of basic research in the natural sciences; of evaluating the direction of effort and the potential of foreign scientific activities; and of supplying information on basic scientific thinking on important incipient developments and on research organizations, personnel, and facilities. In these activities, the science attachés concern themselves with unclassified and legitimately available classified information. No unpublished material is forwarded without permission of the author.

The attachés maintain close working relations with American and foreign officers of programs concerned with the exchange of scientific and technical persons. They usually also are acquainted with American and foreign officers of private research foundations and professional organizations that carry on scholarship and fellowship programs. Thus, the science attachés help promote the international interchange of scientific persons.

Like the Science Adviser's Office at Washington, the science staffs in the missions integrate their work with that of the political, economic, consular,

and public affairs units of the missions abroad. Since many occasions arise in foreign countries necessitating official scientific representation of the United States, the science attachés may be called upon to assume these responsibilities. Accordingly, they may be asked to express the official views of this Government on scientific matters; they may be designated as official representatives of this Government or the National Research Council or other scientific organizations at an international scientific meeting abroad. In sum, the science attachés, in helping the science adviser carry out his duties, perform three main types of functions: reportorial, advisory, and representational.

#### **STATUS OF THE SCIENCE STAFF IN A MISSION**

The science attaché and his assistants are established in each mission as a staff arm to the chief of mission. Thus, the relation of the science staffs to other units of the mission is in general parallel to that of the science adviser to other units of the Department at Washington. That is to say, the science staffs are not operating units in the sense that they carry out particular projects; they are staff units in the sense that they are responsible for advising on the science and engineering aspects of issues arising in all the units of the mission.

#### **AREA COVERED**

As indicated before, science staffs have thus far been assigned to three missions in western Europe. Each is limited primarily to activities within its particular country of assignment and to matters concerning relations between the United States and that country. However, a science attaché at London who is outstanding in biochemistry may, for example, occasionally be requested to undertake duties requiring activities on biochemical matters in Belgium, the Netherlands, or Spain. A science attaché at Bern, whose interests lie primarily in geophysics, may find it advisable and profitable to attend geophysical meetings at Brussels and at Vienna. A science attaché at Stockholm may, from time to time, find it necessary in carrying out his official duties to consult with officers of our missions in Norway, Denmark, or Finland. With appropriate authorization to travel outside its country of assignment, each science staff is thus in a position to cover a wider area than the particular country to which it is assigned. This arrangement also permits an economical utilization of existing scientific competences. Our missions in western Europe can draw upon the different experiences and proficiencies of seven science attachés whenever they are needed to assist on matters relating to science and technology.

#### **EXPANSION OF THE PROGRAM**

In recommending establishment of a dozen or more science staffs abroad, the authors of the Berkner report had in mind that the organization which they proposed would come into full bloom in about 3 or 4 years after its beginning. Establishment of science staffs in western Europe represents the starting point. Great Britain has always been regarded as a most important science center; moreover, a science staff was already in operation there. Science staffs were set up at Stockholm and Bern to cover important science activities in Scandinavia and on the Continent. Other overseas staffs will be established as soon as circumstances permit.

The report did not recommend establishment of a science staff at Moscow. The free movement of American scientists through the Soviet Union did not appear to be practicable. However, the report did recommend that, when clearly in the national interest, encouragement and support be given to official U.S. scientific delegations to that country.

#### **BOUNDARIES OF THE PROGRAM**

It is impractical to delineate precisely the scope of the science program because its activities penetrate those of other programs. A few of the activities clearly outside the boundaries of the science program, however, can be pointed out.

The science program is not a "scientific intelligence" program, although it would be untrue to say that information reported by science attachés is of no value to our national security. The essential reporting role of the science attaché is the promotion of international interchange of scientific information.

The science program is not an exclusive reporting service. The program is not intended to supply foreign scientific information to a particular research program, to particular research organizations, to a particular information program, or to an exchange-of-persons program. The science program serves all these and others in their relation to foreign policy; but it is not subservient to them exclusively.

The science program is not an exchange-of-persons program or a travel service. It does, however, try to facilitate Government and private programs for the international exchange of scientific persons, and it cooperates with officers of the Department concerned with visas and passports in helping scientists travel to and from this country.

The science program is not a grants program. It has no authority and no funds for granting scholarships, fellowships, research stipends, or travel funds for scientific research abroad. It does, however, to the best of its abilities, attempt to help American scientists who inquire about



these matters to seek appropriate sources of funds.

The science program is not itself a research program. It does not send scientists abroad to collaborate with foreign scientists in research projects. Science attachés do, of course, visit laboratories of foreign scientists and promote, when appropriate, international collaboration in research.

#### **Future of the Program**

When the report *Science and Foreign Relations* was prepared, there was good reason for believing that this type of program could accomplish the ends envisioned. At the present time, there is good reason for believing that a successful beginning has been made in the direction recommended in the report. The execution of the program in fulfilling the hopes and expectations of the authors of the report will depend upon many factors. Some of them follow.

#### **SCIENCE IN GOVERNMENT**

The program proposed in the Berkner report is, it seems, in tune with the times. Since the last war, science has permeated the Government in several areas. The research and development program of the Defense agencies has grown significantly and has drawn scientists all over the United States more closely than ever before toward government. The feeling that scientists and Government officials should collaborate in developing policy and programs is reflected almost daily in the newspapers. The creation of the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific Research and Development and the recent establishment by Congress of the National Science Foundation, following the recommendations of the President's Scientific Research Board, represent other signposts of the impact of science upon government. Since the last war, the number of international scientific meetings has increased more rapidly than ever before. Moreover, several foreign governments have established in this country scientific or technical representatives to promote the exchange of information and to carry on other functions relating to science. Great Britain, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark are among the countries so represented. The introduction of science into the foreign-affairs aspects of government is consonant with the trend.

Press comment, at the time of issuing the Berkner report, was generally favorable to the science-in-government proposal. Typical of the scientific-technical press was the stand taken by the *Chemical and Engineering News*, June 19, 1950, in stating that "We endorse this plan." It was gratified "that at long last Government is recognizing the importance and place of science and technology in modern civilization and international relations." The daily press was more critical but still

it supported the proposals. For example, the *New York Times*, June 11, 1950, believed that "the State Department's report . . . is a document of first-rate political and scientific importance," feeling that the program proposed in it would help in unifying Western science. The *Washington Star*, June 9, 1950, gave its support to the Berkner proposal with the comment: "Though it raises a big practical question as to whether we have enough scientists available and willing to divert their talents to such a project, the whole idea deserves serious study. A lot of good could come from it."

Bringing scientific and technical matters to bear on the formulation of foreign policy and administration seems to be a logical development. When our foreign relations were of a simpler nature, political factors seemed to dominate our thinking in this field. After World War I, when our foreign relations grew more complex, economic factors came more and more to be important ingredients in building our foreign policy. Since the last war, as we have taken a leading role in international affairs and as science and technology have exerted such tremendous influence on human relations, scientific and technological factors can be regarded logically as elements of foreign policy.

#### **INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SCIENCE**

International cooperation among friendly nations for defense and peace entails more than military, political, and economic cooperation. According to Dr. C. J. Mackenzie, in a talk in September 1951 at Montreal before a group of industrialists,

There never was a time when the need to emphasize the international aspect of science was greater. It is a disturbing paradox that today when free peoples are realizing, more than at any time in history, that we must have closer political and material cooperation for our common safety and well-being, we are in some areas in danger of impairing the age-old traditional freedom of science.

The science program recommended in the Berkner report is designed to circumvent this danger.

#### **INHERENT FEATURE OF THE PROGRAM**

The success of the science program will depend in part upon the organization of the overseas staffs. The Foreign Service is organized on a permanent basis with personnel embarked on Foreign Service careers. The officers, trained especially in foreign affairs, usually rotate their assignments within the Foreign Service and the Department. Thus, they may spend 4 years pursuing a particular set of functions in a mission abroad, engage the next 2 years in different activities in the Department in Washington, and follow still different pursuits the next 3 or 4 years in another mission abroad. All these activities, however, are phases of foreign relations.

The need for specialized knowledge for carry-



ing on foreign affairs has been recognized in the establishment of the Foreign Service Reserve as an auxiliary to the Foreign Service. The science attachés are specialists in the sense that they are more proficient than most Foreign Service Officers in matters relating to science and technology.

Keeping in mind the objectives set out before, it follows that science attachés are to be regarded as foreign affairs specialists who can bring their specialized training, experience, and aptitudes to bear upon their work. In this sense, a science attaché may be regarded in a category analogous to the political scientist, or the economist, or the lawyer, or the journalist participating in the foreign affairs work in missions abroad. Each one of these men, with different training, draws upon his own peculiar experience in carrying out functions relating to foreign affairs.

The argument has been advanced that, with a 15 months' appointment, a science attaché just about gets into the swing of being a foreign affairs specialist when his tenure is up and he is replaced by another scientist for another term of 15 months who goes through the same cycle. Thus, the argument runs, the science staffs will chronically be handicapped in achieving the basic objectives of their jobs because the scientists must withdraw precisely at the time when their usefulness is at its peak.

This difficulty may be more apparent than real; or if real, there is reason to believe that it can be overcome. Still, the argument just outlined cannot be cast aside as being unworthy of considera-

tion. In the administration of the program, self-criticism and sensitivity to better alternatives are essential.

#### PROGRESS BY FIAT VS. PROGRESS BY USEFULNESS

Attainment of the objectives set forth before depends also upon how well the work of the science program and that of the other units of the Department and missions are integrated. Collaboration between officers cannot be accomplished by fiat. To be sure, regularized procedures have to be developed. But these have to be adapted in large measure to the practicalities of person-to-person relationships. Progress in integration will be made as officers of the Department and missions are convinced of the usefulness of the collaboration of scientists in foreign-affairs questions that are predominantly political, economic, or legal and as the scientists are convinced of the usefulness of the collaboration of political, economic, and legal officers in foreign-affairs questions that are predominantly scientific and technological.

The structure of the Department has always been flexible. Indeed, the Department is obliged to adapt its organization to meet the changing complexities of international affairs. The institution of the science program is an example of that flexibility.

• *Mr. Rudolph, author of the above article, is assistant to the Science Adviser.*

## The Search for a Bond of Fellowship Between the Free East and the Free West

*by John Foster Dulles  
Consultant to the Secretary<sup>1</sup>*

Asia is a place that Russians remember and that Americans forget.

When we think about foreign affairs we think almost wholly of Europe. During the 5 postwar years, June 1945 to June 1950, about 90 percent of our economic aid went to Europe and about 90 percent of our military aid went to Europe. I suppose that about 90 percent of the foreign affairs thinking of our top officials related to Europe and that 90 percent of the foreign news items carried by our press came from Europe.

That is natural because our country was born on the Atlantic seaboard and most Americans

trace their ancestry back to Europe. We share the political ways, the culture, and the religion of Europe, and, indeed, we are called "Europeans" in much of the world.

The leaders of Russia think ever of Asia. They see there over one billion people to be "amalgamated" into the Soviet Union. Most of these people live in the kind of misery which communism readily exploits; they are easily inflamed against so-called "Western imperialism," and many have not had the long practice of political, economic, and spiritual freedom as makes some people indigestible by Soviet imperialism.

Asia, in addition to providing a vast pool of manpower, provides oil, tin, rubber, and other natural products in great abundance. Japan is

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from an address made before the National Conference of Christians and Jews at Cleveland, Ohio, on Dec. 2 and released to the press on the same date.

a great industrial and shipbuilding center. With Japan, Stalin has said, the Soviet Union would be "invincible."

No wonder the Soviet leaders have an "Asia first" foreign policy. They see that if they can exploit Asia, they can make it into what Stalin has called "the road to victory in the West." For nearly 30 years that strategy has been pursued relentlessly and successfully by the Soviet leaders.

Early in the 1920's a Chinese Communist Party was established and it has been nurtured and helped by Soviet policy until finally in 1949, with vast Russian military aid, it fought its way into control of continental China and its 450 million people. Then Mao-Tse-tung, as the Kremlin's first "President" of China, appealed to the peoples of Asia to rise up in armed struggle on the side of Soviet Russia. We see the response in terms of the fighting in Korea, Indochina, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

### **The Soviet Maneuver for Japan**

Last year it seemed that the Soviet had us outmaneuvered and trapped in Japan. We were occupying Japan under surrender terms which put the Emperor and the Japanese Government under Allied authority. That was justifiable so long as the territorial and disarmament provisions of the surrender terms had still to be carried out; but by 1950, the occupation had fully served the purposes for which it had been established, and to perpetuate our super-rule of Japan would have been to pervert the occupation into a sort of imperialism or colonialism.

That, of course, was just what the Soviet leaders wanted. Then they could accuse us, in Japan and all of Asia, of a new act of "imperialism." They knew that if we continued to interfere in the internal affairs of a proud and sensitive people, it would create resentments which they could fan into an explosive force which would blow us out of Japan, leaving Russia to move in. The free world was being maneuvered into the position of being Japan's jailer, leaving the Communist world to jangle what it claimed were the keys to freedom.

General MacArthur had seen that danger coming; he had warned that the occupation could not safely be continued beyond 5 years and in 1950 the 5 years were up. But we had found no way of getting out. We were in Japan not just on our own account, but for the account of all the Allied Powers and we could not legally or honorably end the occupation until there was peace; and the Soviet Union, while talking peace, had consistently blocked every concrete suggestion for getting peace.

In June 1950, the Government asked me to go to Japan to study the situation with General MacArthur. Secretary of Defense Johnson and General Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, went there at the same time. General MacArthur emphasized to us the danger, and made concrete proposals for surmounting it.

While we were there, the North Koreans, with Soviet support, made their armed attack on the Republic of Korea. That showed how far Soviet communism was prepared to go to gain a position which would dominate Japan. It became obvious that something had to be done. A first necessity was to help the South Koreans to resist. If we had done nothing, the entire free world position in Asia and the west Pacific would have been lost and our western line of defense might have been forced back to California. United States action in Korea was responsive to our United Nations obligation, but it was also fully justifiable by the national interest.

Our Korean action was, in a sense, a defensive effort. There was need to move affirmatively to bring peace to Japan so that Japan could resume control of her own affairs and, of her own volition, become a contributing and sustaining member of the free world.

On September 8, 1950, the President asked me to go to work to conclude a Japanese peace, and in precisely a year from that day a treaty of peace was signed by 49 nations.

The Soviet Government opposed us bitterly all the way, and even hinted that it would treat this act of peace as a ground for war. They, however, received a silencing treatment which made them seem insignificant for the first time in post-war conference history and in the end they faded almost unnoticed from the scene.

At the same time the United States concluded a series of collective security treaties, one with Japan, one with the Philippines, and one with Australia and New Zealand, which made it clear that we were determined to join with the peoples concerned to hold the island chain which, from the Aleutians to New Zealand, marks the western rim of the Pacific.

That adds up to a considerable accomplishment. However, it is nothing about which to boast. We have made only a beginning in dealing constructively with a critical area, where the momentum is still against us and where there are signs that are ominous. It is well to remember the advice of Ahab, the King of Israel:

Let not him that girdeth on his harness boast himself as he that putteth it off.

We have only just begun to gird ourselves in Asia, and if we have won an initial success, the value of that is principally in showing that achievement is possible. It is useful to consider how that came about so that we can, I hope, have more of the same.

The basic foundation for achievement was the strong resolution on the part of the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense to bring about quickly a concrete result. There was an unusual singleness of purpose.

A second essential was that there was national unity. The leaders of the Republican Party were fully consulted and saw clearly the grave danger to our Nation. With high patriotism they gave their support to what, through me, the administration was trying to achieve. Thus we had the national unity which is essential to meet grave external danger.

As a third essential, we achieved an impressive unity among the free-world allies. We won that unity by making peace proposals which were inspired by high ideals.

It was not easy for all of the Allied countries to go along with that kind of a peace. Many of them had been cruelly wounded by Japan and they feared that a free Japan might be a future military menace, or a future economic menace. Some did not want to give to Japan sovereign equality, but to give her only a second-class sovereignty with discriminatory limitations of one sort or another. Some wanted reparation liabilities which, if enforced, would have permanently depressed Japanese standards of living to a dangerous level.

However, in the end, the governments of the Allied signatories saw the problem in true perspective and they placed the common good of the free world above local prejudices and advantages. They showed that the Allies can wage peace together, as they waged war together, and that they will make sacrifices for peace as they made sacrifices for victory. That is something that needed showing and all honor is due those who showed that will and made the sacrifices. In the end, 48 free Allies joined in making with Japan a great covenant of peace and liberation. Every continent, every race, every civilization was represented in a unity which transcended even such bitter controversies as divided Iran and Egypt from Great Britain. The free East and the free West found at least this moment of fellowship.

The drama of that act stirred the hearts of men everywhere who love freedom, peace, and justice, and those concepts were so eloquently expressed by so many free-world leaders at San Francisco that they put to rout the ignoble and imperialistic designs of the Soviet Union.

#### **The Need for More Intimate Cooperation Between East and West**

That is all to the good, but, as I have said, there remains much more to be done. There is desperate need of more general and more intimate cooperation between the free East and the free West, in order that we shall both keep our freedom.

I mentioned that the United States has signed three Pacific security treaties. That is a significant development, but it is pitifully little in relation to the total danger in the Pacific and Asia.

We did not go further at this time because there are great obstacles to developing collective security

strength in this area. One obstacle, principally felt in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, is the fear of renewed Japanese aggression. Another obstacle, present throughout Asia and the Middle East, is the hatred of Western arrogance.

Fear of Japan is natural, but it ought quickly to be allayed. Japanese conduct, coupled with the arrangements actually made for the security of Japan, should soon reassure the former victims of Japanese aggression. The Japanese nation has been thoroughly cured of the ambition to conquer Asia. Of course, if Soviet Russia got into control of Japan, it might force Japan into aggression as it has forced North Korea and Communist China into aggression. But we can be confident that Japan will not do that of her own accord.

Furthermore, the collective security arrangements to be made under the treaty of peace and security treaty will, I hope, be developed in such a way that the defense of the Japan area will be so shared by the United States, particularly as to sea and air power, that Japan would not be able again to be an offensive menace.

As the Japanese peaceful intentions are more fully understood, and as the Pacific security arrangements are worked out, fear of Japan will be dispelled.

Western colonialism has given rise to fears more difficult to banish. The responsible leaders of free Asia do not actually fear that the West will try to revive their political rule and erase the newly won political freedoms of Asia. But the people of Asia and many of the leaders do fear that there cannot be cooperation with the West on a basis of equality, but that cooperation would subject the oriental to an offensive attitude on the part of the Westerners, many of whom in the past assumed racial, cultural, and material superiority, and contempt for the rich and ancient cultures and civilizations of Asia. The Asians do not want to have to put up with that again and they are not willing to risk that even though they are told that that is the only way to save themselves from domination by communism.

The people of Asia who are still free have as yet no first-hand knowledge of Soviet imperialism and they have had long, first-hand knowledge of the attitude of the Westerner as a ruler. People fear what has actually hurt them more than what they only hear about. And so far as hearing is concerned, what they hear mostly is Communist propaganda lauding the so-called racial tolerance that is practiced in Russia and contrasting it with the alleged racial intolerance practiced in the United States.

We Americans must realize that the free East and the free West are not going to join hands to preserve our common freedom unless our hand is a hand of fellowship which clasps the hand of the oriental as that of an equal.



## Eastern and Western States as Sovereign Equals

Under the terms of the peace treaty and the security treaty the Occupation will end, but American military forces will remain in Japan for a time in order to prevent disarmed Japan from being a vacuum of power. All of a sudden the Americans in Japan will cease to be there as conquerors and rulers. From then on, in the words of the Treaty of Peace, they will be dealing with the Japanese "as sovereign equals," with whom they are to "cooperate in friendly association to maintain international peace and security."

It would be hard to think of East and West being subjected to a more difficult test. All of Asia is watching to see what happens and much of Asia is skeptical that we can pass the test. India, for example, refused to sign the Japanese peace treaty because it did not require that the U. S. Forces should be totally withdrawn from Japan and from Okinawa. India called for that because she did not believe that it would be possible for Americans to stay there and have friendly cooperation with Japanese as equals. India in this particular matter seemed to align itself with the Chinese Communists' line, which is that there cannot be "Asia for the Asiatics" unless all Westerners are rooted out of Asia. That kind of an Asia would, of course, not be "Asia for the Asiatics" but "Asia for the Russians," which is what the Communists want. But that is apt to happen unless we demonstrate a capacity to work with Asians on a basis of equality.

I am sure you can see how hard it will be to wipe out intolerances which develop out of differences of race and religion in Asia, where there is a long background of Western arrogance and oriental sensitiveness and where communism is using all of its propagandist skills to influence the people against the West and to magnify every unhappy incident.

As you think that over, you can see how smart the Soviet strategists are in their "Asia first" policy. Seldom has the United States faced so momentous a challenge.

I feel confident that we shall meet that challenge in Japan and Asia generally as we have met it measurably in the Philippines. Our conduct in the Philippines is an asset in Asia of incalculable value. I believe we can make our relations with the Japanese into a similar asset, even though the conditions are much more difficult. A happy working relationship will call for an immense and understanding effort on both sides. The Japanese people will have to make their contribution, for they cannot expect a miracle and they, as well as we, will have to be tolerant.

My confidence in the future is based on the fact that, despite occasional lapses, the people of the West believe, basically, in the equal rights and equal dignity of all men and in the sacredness of the individual personality of all. That faith had

its beginnings in Judea, where East and West met, and it held that all men, without regard to race and color, were the creation and concern of a universal God.

It is significant that when the nations met to draw up the U.N. Charter, it was the Western Powers which sponsored the pledge of "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms." Also, it was the Western Powers who wrote in the pledge to develop self-government and free political institutions among all non-self-governing peoples. At the U.N. Assembly in 1948, it was the Western Powers which strongly supported the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as against the opposition of the Soviet Communist bloc, which, led by Mr. Vyshinsky, contended that individual human beings had no natural rights but only such rights as the State might choose to give them.

There were, of course, some individual Westerners, particularly among those who lived in Asia, who became arrogant in terms of race and who enjoyed a condition that made little men seem big if only their color were white. Some derived wealth from exploitation of colonial peoples. But the very nature of Western belief in the nature of war is such that Western colonialism was from the beginning self-liquidating. The political independence and new dignity that Asians have won in recent years is not a frustration of Western goals, but their fulfillment.

Surely we can find ways to make that clear.

The misunderstandings and fears which exist as between the free East and the free West are not fundamental. That is why I believe they can be swept away. We must, however, recognize that there is some sweeping to be done. We cannot proceed blithely on the same assumptions that we justifiably indulge in when dealing with other Western Powers. There, we take for granted a desire for cooperation and a sense of common destiny, and the main task is to find a formula to express that.

As between free Asia and the free West there is as yet little conscious sense of common destiny and no strong desire to cooperate. Therefore the task is much more than merely negotiating more treaties of mutual defense on a foundation that exists. The foundation has to be built. The leaders and peoples of free Asia need to see more clearly that the present peril comes from the new Soviet imperialism and that this peril can be met without reviving the old Western imperialism or jeopardizing the new sense of dignity and self-respect which have come to the people of Asia.

I believe that our Nation can meet the challenge which now confronts it because I believe that our Nation is great in the true sense of the word. Greatness is an ambiguous word. To some it means power or wealth accompanied by pride and arrogance. America's greatness has never been measured by those standards. Our greatness lay



rather in acts done in faith that man was destined to be free. Throughout our national history that faith has inspired us to perform great deeds. Before us in Asia lies a new opportunity and a new occasion, no less important than those of old. Let us go forward then, with confidence inspired by our great tradition.

## Meetings To Be Held With Japanese Officials

*Statement by John Foster Dulles  
Consultant to the Secretary*

[Released to the press December 6]

I am returning to Japan with a view to informing myself about the situation there. I am not going for the purpose of conducting any negotiations whatsoever. The President has asked me to assume responsibility for presenting to the Senate the case for the ratification of the Japanese peace treaty, the Japanese security treaty, the Australia-New Zealand security treaty, and the Philippine mutual defense treaty. In order to do this adequately, I felt it useful to return to Japan and to look over the situation in company with Senators John Sparkman and H. Alexander Smith, who are, respectively the ranking Democratic and Republican members of the Far East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senators Sparkman and Smith are already on their way to Japan, and we expect to meet there on December 10.

While in Japan, I shall meet with General Ridgway and with representative Japanese, including Prime Minister Yoshida, Diet leaders and other Government officials. I expect on December 14 (December 13, e. s. t.) to address a joint meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

## Withdrawal of Further Trade Concessions on Chinese Imports

On November 26 the President issued a proclamation withdrawing from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade additional tariff concessions initially negotiated with China and proclaiming other miscellaneous trade-agreement matters.<sup>1</sup>

On October 12, 1950, the President signed a proclamation withdrawing from the General

Agreement certain concessions initially negotiated by the United States with China because of the withdrawal of China from the General Agreement in May 1950.<sup>2</sup> Not all concessions initially negotiated with China were terminated at that time. Some such concessions apply to certain items in which contracting parties to the General Agreement, other than China, have or claim a substantial interest. Under article XXVII of the General Agreement, when a country withdraws from the agreement, parties claiming a substantial interest in concessions initially negotiated between two other parties to the agreement may request consultation if such concessions are being terminated. A number of countries requested such consultations with respect to the concessions initially negotiated with China and not withdrawn by the proclamation of October 12, 1950. These consultations have now been held. As a result it has been determined that certain concessions will be continued in effect. In other cases the concessions will be withdrawn and the withdrawal is effected by the present proclamation.<sup>3</sup>

The new rates resulting from termination of the concessions will be effective after the close of business on January 25, 1952.

The proclamation also makes an adjustment with respect to the rate of duty applicable to eviscerated chickens. As of the close of business on January 25, 1952, the rate of duty on this item will be 5¢ per pound as compared with a present rate of 10¢ per pound. Because of a misunderstanding during the consultation with Canada under article XXVII as to the part of the concession on chickens in which Canada had an interest, the concession on eviscerated chicken had been withdrawn by the proclamation of June 12, 1951.

The proclamation provides for a reduction in the duty on prepared or preserved frog legs imported from countries entitled to most-favored-nation treatment from 20 percent *ad valorem* to 12 percent *ad valorem*. The new rate will be effective after the close of business on December 26, 1951. This change results from a preferential concession on frog legs made to Cuba at Geneva in 1947, and is required in order to comply with provisions of the General Agreement prohibiting increases in margins of preference.

In addition, the proclamation proclaims a declaration on the continued application of the schedules of the General Agreement. The signatories thereof undertook not to invoke article XXVIII of the General Agreement prior to January 1, 1954. Article XXVIII provides for the withdrawal of concessions through a relatively simple procedure.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 23, 1950, p. 659.

<sup>2</sup> For information on the products on which concessions will be withdrawn and the agreement rates and the new rates, see Department of State press release 1054 of Nov. 27, 1951.

<sup>3</sup> For information regarding the escape clause contained in the proclamation, see *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> For text of the proclamation, see 16 *Fed. Reg.* 11943.

## France Presents Observations and Submissions On Rights of American Nationals in Morocco

*December 20, 1951, has been set as the new date for filing the Counter-Memorial of the U.S. Government in the case concerning the rights of nationals of the United States in Morocco (France/United States of America) presently pending before the International Court of Justice.*

*The case was begun in October 1950 when the Government of the French Republic instituted proceedings against the United States. The Memorial of the French Government was filed with the Court on March 1, 1951. According to the schedule as fixed by the Court, the Counter-Memorial of the U.S. Government was to have been filed by July 1, 1951. However, the U.S. Government on June 21, 1951, filed a preliminary objection which suspended the proceedings on the merits.<sup>1</sup> In the preliminary objection, the U.S. Government pointed out that the capacity in which France was acting in the case was unclear and that the U.S. Government deemed it essential that both Morocco and France be parties to the case and so be bound by the Court's decision. Because the French Government had not, by June 21, 1951, made clear to the U.S. Government whether it was acting both in its own capacity and in its capacity of Protector of Morocco, the U.S. Government sought by raising the preliminary objection to secure a ruling on the identity of the parties.*

*On July 28, 1951, the French Government filed its observations and submissions on the U.S. Government's preliminary objection. Following is an English translation of the observations and submissions of the French Government:*

### FRENCH OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS

The Government of the French Republic, having taken note of the preliminary objection filed on June 21, 1951, by the Government of the United States of America in the case concerning the rights of nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, presents to the Court the following observations and submissions:

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of July 30, 1951, p. 179.

### I. The Facts

The Government of the United States of America states, in its preliminary objection, that the application instituting proceedings, filed on October 28, 1950, failed to specify the parties to the suit, and that this formal defect was not corrected in the Memorial filed by the Government of the French Republic on March 1, 1951, in accordance with the order made by the Court on November 22, 1950. The preliminary objection is thus raised as a means of securing a decision "whether the party or parties in whose name and on whose behalf the present proceedings have been instituted consist of: (a) the French Republic in its own right and capacity; (b) the French Republic as Protector of Morocco on behalf of the State of Morocco; or (c) the French Republic in its own right and capacity and as Protector of Morocco on behalf of the State of Morocco."

The Government of the United States of America further requests the Court to determine whether that Government "would be entitled to present a counter-claim or counter-claims designed to insure that the judgment of the Court on the merits would be binding on the State of Morocco and on the French Republic both in its own right and capacity and as Protector of Morocco."

Before indicating the position of the Government of the French Republic with regard to the preliminary objection by the Government of the United States of America, it is necessary to lay before the Court certain additional particulars relating to the facts.

The preliminary objection filed by the Government of the United States of America refers to "discussions with representatives of the French Government . . . continued over a number of weeks" which ended in the refusal of these representatives, on June 9, 1951, to "make any formal statement concerning the identity of the parties in whose name and on whose behalf the present case has been brought" (page 4 of the objection).

In fact, as is clear from a reading of the notes exchanged between the Department of State and the French Embassy in Washington, copies of

which are annexed hereto,<sup>2</sup> the "discussions between the Government of the United States and the representatives of the French Government" were limited to the delivery by the Department of State of a memorandum to the French Embassy on April 23, 1951 (Annex I), and to the Embassy's reply of June 2, 1951 (Annex II), with such oral comments as may have been made at the time of the exchange. The Government of the French Republic would point out that if, as is indicated in the preliminary objection, the Government of the United States of America had been left in uncertainty since October 28, 1950, when the application was filed, or indeed after March 1, 1951, when the French memorial was filed in the Court, it could, before April 23, 1951, have sought clarification from the Government of the French Republic.

In the memorandum of April 23, 1951, the Government of the United States of America states that in order to insure the binding character of the judgment of the Court in relation to Morocco, it is necessary that the French Republic should appear in the present suit in its own right and as Protector of Morocco. The preliminary objection repeats the terms of the memorandum. It may be observed, however, that, contrary to the statement in the memorandum of April 23, the application instituting proceedings contains no reference to its being made "on behalf of [*pour le compte de*] the Government of the French Republic."

The French note of June 2, 1951, was a reply to the question which had been raised and the French Embassy in Washington, having delivered it, might well believe that this exchange of views, though somewhat unusual in the case of pending judicial proceedings, proceedings as to the necessity for which the two Governments had long since reached agreement, (See the Memorial of March 1, pp. 13, 14, 16, 17, and Annex XXIX, English translation, pp. 10 and 13) would allay the apprehensions of the Government of the United States of America. The filing of the preliminary objection on June 21 shows that this was not the case.

The "discussion" having been reduced to its true proportions, the Government of the French Republic will seek to show that it is unnecessary for the Court to adjudicate upon the submissions made in the preliminary objection filed by the Government of the United States of America.

## II. Analysis of the Argument of the United States of America

The objection filed by the Government of the United States of America is primarily based on article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and article 32, paragraph 2, of the Rules, which provide that the parties to a dispute must be in-

dicated; this requirement is said not to have been satisfied by the application or by the Memorial filed by France. "The United States is concerned to secure an exact identification of the parties to the present case in order to know in advance what States (and in what capacity so far as France is concerned) would be bound by the Judgment of the Court in the present case. This case concerns the rights of American nationals in Morocco under bilateral treaties between the United States and Morocco, and under certain multilateral treaties—the Convention of Madrid of July 3, 1880, and the Act of Algeiras of April 7, 1906—to which France as well as the United States and Morocco are parties" (page 6 of the objection). Since, by article 59 of the Statute of the Court, the binding force of a judgment is limited to the parties to a case, the Government of the United States of America is desirous that Morocco as well as France, in its own name and as protecting power, should be bound.

The preliminary objection refers to certain cases in which it is said that a distinction was drawn between the capacity of France in its own right and France as a protecting power.

## III. Observations on the Requests of the Government of the United States of America

The requests of the Government of the United States of America having the double object of a determination of the parties and of the binding effect of the judgment, the Government of the French Republic will direct its observations to answering these two points.

### (A) DETERMINATION OF THE PARTIES

The Government of the French Republic is of the opinion that the application instituting proceedings of October 28, 1950, and the Memorial of March 1, 1951, clearly indicate the parties in accordance with the provisions of article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and article 32, paragraph 2, of the Rules.

These provisions, upon which reliance is placed by the Government of the United States of America, are linked with other texts which it is necessary to bear in mind: Article 34, paragraph 1, of the statute: "Only States may be parties in cases before the Court"—article 35, paragraph 1, of the statute: "The Court shall be open to the States parties to the present Statute"—article 93, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations: "All Members of the United Nations are *ipso facto* parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice." France, an original member of the United Nations as defined in article 3 of the Charter, is therefore, a party to the statute. The application instituting proceedings in the case of the rights of American nationals in Morocco makes it clear that France, acting through the Government of the Republic, is a party to the dispute (see

<sup>2</sup> Not here printed.



the expressions used on p. 4 and p. 10 of the application—English translation, p. 5 and p. 11; in the Memorial of March 1, 1951, p. 15 and p. 17—English translation, p. 11 and p. 13).

The Statute of the Court requires no more. Article 40 of the Statute and article 32 of the Rules of Court are intended to insure that a party to a dispute is of a capacity to appear before the Court. France has an unquestionable capacity to appear in proceedings instituted for the presentation of an international claim, a general right defined in the advisory opinion of April 11, 1949, on reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations (pp. 176-178), and France is exercising this right in the present dispute. The anxiety evinced by the Government of the United States of America therefore does not in truth relate to the "identity" of the parties, which is manifest, but relates in reality to the determination of the rights for the protection of which France is proceeding, which is a wholly different matter.

These were the reasons for the reply given on June 2, 1951, by the Government of the French Republic to the Government of the United States of America.

It is now necessary to show that the three examples chosen by the Government of the United States of America in seeking to establish that the identity of the parties has not been sufficiently specified have not the significance which has been attached to them.

1. Letter from the French Embassy to the United States of America dated January 19, 1917 (set out in Annex LIX to the French Memorial of March 1, 1951, at p. 181).

This letter was written to correct the mistake made by the Secretary of State in his letter of January 15, 1917, to the French Embassy, wherein recognition was granted to the French Protectorate over the French zone of the Sheriffian Empire, whereas the treaty of March 30, 1912, between the Sheriffian Empire and France applied to the whole of that Empire. The letter of January 19 goes on to point out that the rights of Spain are, in accordance with article 1 of the treaty of March 30, 1912 (Annex XXXVIII to the Memorial of March 1, 1951, p. 73) to be settled by agreement between France and Spain. It is upon this passage that the Government of the United States seeks to rely as evidence that France negotiated in relation to Morocco in a capacity other than that of protecting state; whereas it was, on the contrary, the protectorate treaty which in fact provided for such negotiation, by the grant of capacity by agreement between the Sheriffian Empire and France at the time of the establishment of the protectorate by the two States. The Franco-Spanish negotiations were the result of the treaty of 1912, from which they sprang: Article 1, paragraph 3, "The Government of the Re-

public will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government regarding the interests which this Government has in virtue of its geographical position and territorial possessions on the Moroccan coast."<sup>3</sup> The negotiations with Spain therefore constituted the exercise of the competence which was accorded to France by the treaty of 1912.

2. Convention between France and Great Britain of July 29, 1937.

This convention, the full title of which is given in Annex B to the preliminary objection, though not in the text of the objection, is entitled "Convention concerning the abolition of capitulations in Morocco and Zanzibar" (see Annex XXXVIII to the French Memorial of March 1, 1951, p. 148). This title alone suffices to explain why the convention should begin with the words "His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the President of the French Republic, acting in his own name and on behalf of His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco." Whereas articles 17 to 24 of the convention relate exclusively to the renunciation by France of all rights and privileges of a capitulatory character in Zanzibar, it was clear that France in that part of the treaty was acting "on its own behalf" [*pour son propre compte*] to make use of the expression employed by the Government of the United States of America, while at the same time, in the other part of the convention, France was acting on behalf of [*pour le compte de*] Morocco. In short, there were two treaties in one, hence the point raised by the Government of the United States of America.

3. The case concerning phosphates in Morocco (Judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice of June 14, 1938, series A/B 74).

The Government of the United States of America appears to attach importance to the form of words used in the final part of the Italian application in this case: "May it please the Court: To notify the present application, in conformity with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Court's Statute, to the Government of the French Republic, as such, and as protector of Morocco:" (series C, No. 84, p. 14 (1938) . . . and not p. 15 (1936) as indicated in the objection of the Government of the United States of America). This is to read a lot into the words of a notification, an essential procedural act without consequences, the choice of words for which affects no one but the Italian Government. It is noteworthy that this is the only passage in all the documents in that case which the Government of the United States of America has cited, whereas in the pleadings and in the judgment there is to be found abundant evidence that the party to the dispute was the Government of the French Republic; the most

<sup>3</sup> *American Journal of International Law*, Supplement, vol. VI, 1912, Official Documents, p. 208.



conclusive evidence indeed is the rejection, in the operative part of the judgment, of the Italian claim, on the ground that the dispute had arisen with regard to circumstances and facts earlier in date than the ratification of France's acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction. The Permanent Court, on June 14, 1938, had no doubt as to the "identity" of the party to the case, and the argument based on the form of the notification automatically falls to the ground; it need only be added that the Government of the United States of America, in its own objection of June 21, 1951, asks for its communication simply to the Government of the French Republic.

The Government of the French Republic will conclude its observations on this first point with a quotation from the award No. 30A, made on October 19, 1928, by the Franco-Mexican Claims Commission:

"The first assertion applies to the conduct of international proceedings, rules and customs pertaining to the domain of municipal law which are foreign to international relations." (*Reparation for Injuries caused to foreigners by revolutionary movements*, Reports of the Franco-Mexican Commission, Paris, Pedone, 1933, p. 172.)

#### (B) EFFECT OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

Strictly speaking, the preliminary objection of June 21, 1951, appears primarily to reflect anxiety on the part of the United States of America with regard to the effect of the judgment of the Court; will the decision be binding upon Morocco and upon France, "and as to the latter, in what capacity?" This request is in fact the seeking of an opinion on the effect of article 59 of the Statute of the Court. It did not appear to the Government of the Republic to be possible to engage in an exchange of diplomatic notes with the Government of the United States of America on the question of the interpretation of a provision of the statute; on the other hand, however unusual such a seeking for an opinion may be, the French Government can see no objection to the indication of its own views on the question, in the document now submitted to the Court. According to article 59, the decision of the Court is binding on "the parties and in respect of that particular case," and it is only necessary to recall the object of the proceedings for the difficulties, which the Government of the United States of America thinks it sees, to disappear.

The application instituting proceedings of October 28, 1950, was submitted by France on the question of the construction placed by the Government of the United States of America on treaties entered into by Morocco. It is therefore necessary to construe the effect of certain treaty obligations; the decision of the Court on the interpretation of these obligations will be binding in the present dispute submitted to its jurisdiction.

The treaties in question are indeed of two kinds: bilateral treaties between Morocco and the United States of America, and multilateral treaties to which Morocco, France, and the United States are parties.

France, which is charged with the international relations of Morocco by virtue of the protectorate treaty, is competent to request the Court's interpretation of bilateral and multilateral treaties entered into by Morocco with the United States of America.

Insofar as bilateral treaties are concerned, it is clear that the interpretation given to them by the Court, in the dispute submitted to it, will be binding on Morocco and on the United States, and also that by virtue of its binding force on Morocco, it will be binding upon the authorities of the Protectorate acting within the sphere of their competence. The latter will be obliged to respect the interpretation given by the Court, which will become part of the treaty law of Morocco which these authorities are bound to observe.

With regard to multilateral treaties, certain provisions of which may be the subject of interpretation in the judgment of the Court, it is beyond question that France, being a party to the case, will be bound, in its relations with the United States of America, by the interpretation of multilateral conventions to which the two States are signatories. In the same way as in the case of bilateral treaties, Morocco, which has signed certain of the multilateral treaties invoked in the present case, will be bound by their interpretation which France was competent to request of the Court. Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Statute reserves to every signatory state of a multilateral treaty the right to take part in proceedings for an interpretation of its provisions. The Government of the United States of America cannot have supposed that France, having seised the Court of a request based on the interpretation of agreements to which it was a signatory, could claim to disregard the Court's decision, which would clearly be contrary to the basic principle of good faith in international relations. It is so obvious that France is a party to the dispute and that it will be bound by the interpretation in this case of the various multilateral conventions to which it is a signatory, that it never occurred to the Registry of the Court to notify France of the possibility of intervening in the proceedings by virtue of article 63, paragraph 2, in order to take part in the proceedings for the interpretation of these multilateral conventions.

It therefore appears that the preliminary objection raised by the Government of the United States of America is without substance. The effect of the judgment of the Court is no more in doubt than is the identity of the parties to the proceedings. France, being competent to appear before the Court, has seised the Court of a dispute, the subject-matter of which is defined in the ap-

plication instituting proceedings, of October 28, 1950, and the Memorial, of March 1, 1951. The effect of the judgment is dependent on the nature of the rights invoked.

Accordingly, the Government of the French Republic has the honour to make the following submissions to the Court:

#### MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

Whereas the Application instituting proceedings, filed in the Registry of the Court on October 28, 1950, satisfies the requirements of article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court, and of article 32, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court,

Whereas the Government of the French Republic is competent to request of the Court a construction of the treaties binding Morocco, and whereas it is obliged to respect the Court's construction of these treaties and, both in the capacity of protecting power and of signatory power, the construction of multilateral instruments to which France and Morocco are parties,

To adjudge devoid of object the preliminary objection filed on June 21, 1951, by the Government of the United States of America.

ANDRÉ GROS  
*Agent for the Government of  
the French Republic*

*July 28, 1951*

#### U. S.-FRENCH CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

*For the purpose of requesting a waiver of oral hearings so as to secure an early disposition of the preliminary objection and for the added purpose of amplifying and correcting the statement of facts as presented in the observations and submissions of the French Government, the agent of the Government of the United States sent the following letter to the President of the International Court of Justice, which was filed in the Court Registry of August 21, 1951:*

SIR: The United States Government has received and noted the "Observations and Submissions of the Government of the Republic of France" on the Preliminary Objection filed in the Case concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco. My Government has noted that the French Government asks the Court "to adjudge devoid of object the Preliminary Objection filed on June 21st, 1951 by the Government of the United States of America." Although the French Government in its Observations and Submissions on the Preliminary Objection has offered its own views concerning the effect of the judgment of the Court, it has not, in the opinion of my Government, clarified the question of the identity of the parties. The controlling importance of this question under Article 59 of the Statute of the Court is evident. For this reason, the United States Government remains anxious that the Court should decide the points raised in the Preliminary Objection at an early date prior to proceedings on the merits. With this end in view, my Government is prepared to waive the oral hearings as envisaged in Article 62 of the Rules of Court, and hopes that the Government of the French Republic

likewise will express readiness to waive oral hearings. Further with a view to speedy determination of the issues raised by the Preliminary Objection, my Government wishes to indicate now its request that the Court consider and decide the Preliminary Objection at the earliest date practicable. My Government hopes that the French Government will join in this request for early disposition of the Preliminary Objection.

In its Observations and Submissions on the Preliminary Objection, the French Government stated that "the 'discussions between the Government of the United States and the Representatives of the French Government' were limited to the delivery by the Department of State of a memorandum to the French Embassy on April 23, 1951 (Annex I) and to the Embassy's reply of June 2, 1951 (Annex II), with such oral comments as may have been made at the time of the exchange." My Government would like to take this opportunity to amplify and correct as follows that statement of facts: Following the meeting of April 23, 1951, at which a United States memorandum was given by officers of the Department of State to a representative of the French Embassy in Washington, an officer of the Department of State talked with the representative of the French Embassy on May 21, to express concern at the delay in receiving a French reply and to inquire when a reply might be expected to the United States memorandum of April 23. The representative of the French Embassy replied that the preliminary view of the French Government was that no reason existed for any amendment of the French Application or Memorial in the Moroccan Case. On June 2 another meeting took place between officers of the Department of State and a representative of the French Embassy. At this meeting the French Embassy gave to the Department the memorandum reproduced in Annex II of the French Observations and Submissions. The Department informed the Embassy that this memorandum did not satisfactorily identify the parties to the Case. On June 4 the Department agreed to furnish to the Embassy a brief draft statement which, in the opinion of the Department, would provide the necessary clarification. The draft statement furnished read as follows:

In response to an inquiry from the Government of the United States, the Government of the French Republic states that it has brought the Application in the Case concerning the Rights of American Ressortissants in Morocco, and acts in this case, both in its capacity as Government of the French Republic and on behalf of Morocco, by virtue of the capacity of France under the Treaty of Fez as Protector of Morocco.

On June 6 a representative of the French Embassy called again at the Department, and left a memorandum reading as follows:

La Requete du Gouvernement de la République française au Président de la Cour de Justice Internationale en date du 28 octobre 1950, le Mémoire du 1er mars 1951 et le memorandum remis au Département d'Etat le 2 juin indiquent que la France agit, dans l'affaire relative aux droits des ressortissants américains au Maroc, en qualité de puissance protectrice au Maroc.

La requête notamment se réfère expressément au traité du 30 mars 1912 conclu entre le Gouvernement de la République française et l'Empire Chérifien.

Il est une règle de droit bien établie que 'seul le protecteur représente le territoire protégé dans ses rapports internationaux' (cf. Arbitrage rendu le 1er mai 1925 par M. Max Huber entre la Grande Bretagne et l'Espagne).

The Department informed the Embassy that this memorandum failed to state specifically that both Morocco and France (in its own right and as protector of Morocco) were parties to the case. On June 9 the Embassy informed the Department that it was not prepared to make any formal statement concerning the identity of the parties in whose name and on whose behalf the present case was brought. At that time, as on previous occasions, the De-

partment inquired whether the Embassy understood that in the absence of clarification as to the identity of the parties the United States would feel compelled to file a Preliminary Objection on this point. As on the previous occasions, the Embassy stated that it understood this fully.

Since the receipt by my Government of the Observations and Submissions of the Government of the French Republic on the Preliminary Objection, the French Government, through its Embassy in Washington, has inquired if the United States would withdraw its Preliminary Objection. The United States is not able to withdraw the Objection since even in the Observations and Submissions of the French Government on the Preliminary Objection the identity of the parties is not made clear; this matter, in view of the provision of Article 59 of the Statute of the Court, is one to which my Government attaches great importance.

Very truly yours,

ADRIAN S. FISHER  
Agent of the Government  
of the United States of America

*On September 3, 1951, there was filed in the Court Registry a letter from the agent of the Government of the French Republic, in which the French Government concurred in the U.S. Government's request for waiver of oral hearings on the preliminary objection. The text of this letter is as follows:*

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS, FRENCH  
REPUBLIC.

Paris, August 30th, 1951

(Translation)

SIR: You were good enough, by letter No. 14358 of August 23rd, 1951, to transmit to me a copy of a letter, filed in the Registry on August 21st, 1951, which the Agent of the United States Government addressed to the President of the Court in the case concerning the rights of nationals of the United States of America in Morocco.

In this letter the United States Government states that it is "prepared to waive the oral hearings as envisaged in Article 62 of the Rules of Court, and hopes that the Government of the French Republic likewise will express readiness to waive oral hearings." Furthermore, the United States Government requests the Court to consider and decide the Preliminary Objection filed by it on June 21st, 1951 at the earliest date practicable.

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the French Republic agrees with the United States Government in proposing that the Court should authorize them to waive oral hearings in respect of the Preliminary Objection filed by the United States Government on June 21st, 1951. It is likewise the earnest hope of the Government of the French Republic that, insofar as the Court considers it possible, a decision on the Preliminary Objection should be made at the earliest date practicable.

The remainder of the letter of the Agent of the United States Government is a discussion of the facts recited in the Observations and Submissions presented on July 28th, 1951 by the Government of the French Republic on the Preliminary Objection filed by the United States Government. The Government of the French Republic would have wished that the debate which the United States Government states it desires to shorten, should not thus be prolonged. But as the letter of the Agent of the United States Government is a document in the proceedings before the Court, it is necessary to rectify it briefly on the two following points.

1. In the penultimate paragraph of the letter it is stated:

At that time, as on previous occasions, the Department inquired whether the Embassy understood that in the absence of clarification as to the identity of the

parties the United States would feel compelled to file a Preliminary Objection on this point. As on the previous occasions, the Embassy stated that it understood this fully.

The French Embassy has never recognized that the United States of America was obliged to file a Preliminary Objection; it confined itself to taking note of the declarations made by the Department of State and to transmitting to it the reply of the Government of the French Republic. From the very beginning of the conversations which the United States Government chose to initiate in Washington, whereas Article 42 of the Statute of the Court provides that the parties shall be represented by agents, the French Embassy has not failed to note, without discerning the reasons for it, the decision of the United States Government to file a Preliminary Objection in the absence of acceptance of a formula the want of substance of which the Government of the French Republic believes it has established in its Observations and Submissions of July 28th, 1951.

2. The last paragraph of the letter of the Agent of the United States Government reads as follows:

Since the receipt by my Government of the Observations and Submissions of the Government of the French Republic on the Preliminary Objection, the French Government, through its Embassy in Washington, has inquired if the United States would withdraw its Preliminary Objection.

It is proper to point out that this initiative was not taken by the Government of the French Republic as suggested in the above-quoted wording. It was the United States Embassy in Paris which pointed out to the Agent of the Government of the French Republic that the United States Government might withdraw the Preliminary Objection if the Observations and Submissions presented on that Objection appeared to reply to its preoccupations. Consequently the Government of the French Republic was entitled, after the deposit of its Observations to know the intentions of the United States Government on this point. Even better than the present proposals, discontinuance would have shortened the written proceedings in the case.

ANDRÉ GEOS

Agent of the Government of  
the French Republic before  
the International Court of  
Justice.

*On October 4, 1951, the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, pursuant to direction of the Court, addressed the following letter to the agent of the French Government, a copy of which was transmitted to the agent of the United States Government:*

No. 14635

THE HAGUE, October 4, 1951

SIR: I have been directed by the Court, and I have the honor, to bring to your notice the following observations on the subject of the case concerning the Rights of Nationals of the United States in Morocco (France v. United States of America).

The Court has considered the Preliminary Objection filed by the United States Government on June 21st, 1951, the Observations and Submissions of the Government of the French Republic on that Objection, as well as the correspondence which followed the deposit of these documents.

It has noted that the explanations given by the Government of the French Republic have not dispelled certain doubts existing in the mind of the United States Government as to the "exact identification of the parties" to the case and as to the capacity in which France has instituted these proceedings.



The Court has also taken note of the wish expressed by both Governments that the matter should be settled as speedily as possible, and, to this end, that the oral proceedings provided for in Article 62 of the Rules should be waived. Before reaching a decision on this point, however, the Court observes that Article 49 of the Statute empowers it, without instituting oral proceedings on the Preliminary Objection, to call upon the Agents of the Parties to supply such explanations as it considers necessary. For this reason, the Court, having this day deliberated the matter, has decided to request you to clarify the capacity in which the French Republic is proceeding in this case, and, in particular, to specify whether it is appearing both on its own account and as Protecting Power in Morocco.

I am transmitting a copy of the present communication to the Agent of the Government of the United States.

E. HAMBRØ  
Registrar

*Upon receipt of the above letter, the agent of the French Government, on October 6, 1951, made the following reply:*

PARIS, October 6, 1951.

SIR: In your letter of October 4th, 1951, you were so good as to make a communication to me on the subject of the case concerning the rights of nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (*France v. United States of America*).

You informed me that the Court had noted that the explanations given by the Government of the French Republic had not dispelled certain doubts existing in the mind of the United States Government as to the "exact identification of the Parties" to the case, and as to the capacity in which France had instituted these proceedings. You added that the Court had decided, in application of Article 49 of the Statute, to call upon me to clarify the capacity in which the French Republic is proceeding in this case, and in particular, to specify whether it is appearing both on its own account and as the protecting Power of Morocco.

In reply to this request by the Court, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the French Republic is prepared, in order to dispel the doubts existing in the mind of the Government of the United States, to supplement its observations and submissions in regard to the Preliminary Objection raised by the United States Government, and to specify that the French Republic is proceeding in this case both on its own account and as the protecting Power of Morocco, and that the Court's Judgment will be binding both on France and on Morocco.

ANDRÉ GROS

*On October 9, 1951, the Court Registrar addressed the following letter to the agent of the Government of the United States, Adrian S. Fisher.*

SIR: Referring to my letter No. 14636 of October 4th, 1951, in the case concerning the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, I have the honour to send you herewith a copy of a letter of October 6th, 1951, which I have received today from the Agent of the Government of the French Republic.

Referring to your note of August 16th, 1951, and in particular to the last paragraph of that note, I should be much obliged to you for advising me as soon as possible as to the action you propose to take in view of the letter of the Agent of the French Government.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your Obedient Servant,

E. HAMBRØ  
Registrar

*In response to the inquiry which was contained in the Court Registrar's letter, the agent of the Government of the United States addressed the following letter to the Registrar:*

SIR: I refer to your letter No. 14670 of October 9, 1951, in which you ask to be advised as to the action which my Government proposes to take in view of the letter of the Agent of the French Government of October 6, 1951, which was addressed to you in response to your letter of October 4, 1951.

According to the letter of the Agent of the French Government of October 6, 1951, the United States Government understands the Government of the French Republic to state that it is proceeding in the case concerning the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco both on its own account and as protecting Power of Morocco, and that the Court's judgment will be binding both on France and on Morocco. Accordingly, I inform you that on the basis of this understanding the Government of the United States of America is prepared to withdraw its Preliminary Objection.

Very truly yours,

ADRIAN S. FISHER  
Agent of the Government  
of the United States of America

NOTE: As a result of the clarification of the identity of the parties which was made to the Court by the agent of the French Government, the proceedings on the merits have been resumed, and the Counter-Memorial of the U.S. Government is to be filed in the Registry of the International Court by December 20, 1951.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

**Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Nicaragua.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2199. Pub. 4150. 14 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Nicaragua—Signed at Managua January 31, 1951; entered into force January 31, 1951.

**Education, Cooperative Program in Nicaragua.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2200. Pub. 4151. 14 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Nicaragua—Signed at Managua January 31, 1951; entered into force January 31, 1951.

(Continued on page 1001)



## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Discussion of Tensions Between Yugoslavia and U.S.S.R.

*Statement by John Sherman Cooper  
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly<sup>1</sup>*

We are concerned here with a situation of tension involving eight different countries in Eastern Europe: seven members of the Soviet Cominform bloc on the one hand and Yugoslavia on the other.

This situation has now lasted for 3½ years and is undermining the peace and security of the Balkan area.

Yugoslavia has placed before the General Assembly a complaint alleging hostile activities on the part of the Soviet Union, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland against Yugoslavia.

It is the Yugoslav contention that these activities, taken in combination, constitute a campaign of aggressive pressure designed to threaten the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national independence of the Yugoslav state. The Yugoslav Government holds the Soviet Union chiefly responsible for this campaign of pressure, which it alleges has been intensified according to a definite plan.

We have heard Mr. Djilas describe in detail and with impressive documentation how this campaign has been pressed by the Soviet Union and the other six Cominform governments. As we understand it from his statement, the Yugoslav case rests on these principal charges against the Cominform countries:

The deliberate economic blockade of Yugoslavia; persistent demands for the overthrow of the Yugoslav Government; activities by trained terrorists sent into Yugoslavia; the provocation of border incidents and the killing and wounding of Yugoslav frontier guards and citizens; the forced

deportation of Yugoslav minorities from border areas; the abrogation of a large number of treaties and conventions; discriminatory diplomatic practices; the building up of armed strength by Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary in violation of the military clauses of the postwar peace treaties; and demonstrative troop movements and maneuvers in the frontier areas bordering on Yugoslavia.

The activities of the Soviet Union and the other six states as charged by the Yugoslav Government clearly constitute failure to observe the minimum standards of the Charter. The charges described a situation seriously affecting international peace and security in the Balkan area and elsewhere.

For its part, the United States is concerned with the application of the Charter to this situation. Under article I of the Charter it is the first purpose of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, to take collective measures to remove threats to the peace and to suppress acts of aggression if they occur, and to bring about the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Charter protects any state, whether large or small, and whatever its economic, social, and political system. It is in the name of this general principle of the Charter that the United Nations has undertaken the task of repelling aggression in Korea and of restoring peace and security in the area.

It is clear to all of us that any new recourse to aggression in the world today might, as the President of the United States has stated, "strain to the breaking point the fabric of world peace."

All of us must strive to reduce these strains on peace and to lessen tension wherever it exists.

The U.S. Government is disturbed over the danger to world peace which, as the Yugoslav

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly on Nov. 29 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

delegate has shown, the actions of the Soviet Union and the other Cominform states have done nothing to diminish.

We are, as I say, concerned with the application of the Charter to the situation outlined to us by the delegation from Yugoslavia. Another purpose of the United Nations outlined in article 1 of the Charter is to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state is contradictory to this principle and is expressly prohibited by the Charter.

We are also obligated to promote universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

We need to consider whether the states named in the Yugoslav complaint are meeting these minimum standards of the Charter in their relations with Yugoslavia.

#### **Pattern of Conduct by Cominform Regimes**

The United States cannot confirm from its own first-hand information all the charges that Yugoslavia has made against the seven Cominform states. We are in a position to confirm some of the charges from independent observation. Furthermore, there is available to us an historical record disclosing a general pattern of conduct of the Cominform regimes.

This general pattern of conduct will help us a great deal in our evaluation of the Yugoslav complaint.

Within this pattern of conduct you will find the subversion of free institutions, followed by the armed coup d'état, as in the case of Czechoslovakia. You will find the support of an armed attempt to overthrow the government of a neighboring state, as in the case of Greece, or support for armed aggression on a more massive scale, as in Korea.

You will find the deliberate attempt to gain a political objective by dooming a city to starvation, as in the case of the Berlin Blockade. You will find the effort to wreck the postwar recovery of Europe itself, one of the prime objectives of the Cominform.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, you will find as part of this pattern the endless "hate" campaigns for fabricated "enemies," forced labor, secret police, the mockery of justice in faked propaganda "trials," and the ruthless suppression of the rights of the individual. The Yugoslav complaint should be considered against the background of this pattern of conduct. It is this pattern of conduct, persistently followed by the Soviet Union and the Cominform countries, which in our judgment, is the root cause of the tensions in this part of the world. We cannot allay these tensions by ignoring their causes.

The Yugoslav delegation charges that as part of

their campaign of aggressive pressure, the Cominform states have been openly calling upon the people of Yugoslavia to overthrow the Government of Marshall Tito.

My Government has not undertaken a count of all the official radio broadcasts or newspaper articles which have demanded the liquidation of the Government of Yugoslavia. But we have seen enough samples to know that this is what the Cominform clearly desires to have happen. We have also read speeches calling for the overthrow of the Yugoslav Government by the highest government officials of the Soviet Union and of Eastern Europe.

We know as a fact that public statements of this sort have been made by several members of the Soviet Politburo, the central source of power and authority in the Soviet Government. They include Deputy Premier Molotov, former Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union; K. E. Voroshilov, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Deputy Premier; N. A. Bulganin, Deputy Premier; and G. M. Malenkov, Deputy Premier.

It was only last July that in a speech delivered in Warsaw, Mr. Molotov said of the Yugoslav regime:

This gang clings to power by means of sanguinary terror and fascist methods of rule. This cannot last long. The peoples of Yugoslavia will find ways and means of getting rid of the Titoite fascist regime.

A month later another member of the Soviet Politburo, Marshal Voroshilov, used identical language in a speech he delivered in Bucharest, Rumania.

The resolutions of the Cominform concerning Yugoslavia—resolutions drawn up and signed by the highest officials of the countries listed in the Yugoslav complaint—are also in the public domain and can be read by anyone.

The first of these resolutions, adopted in June 1948, stated flatly that the Yugoslav regime could "not be tolerated" and that "the interests of the very existence . . . of the Yugoslav Communist Party demand that an end be put to this regime."

A second Cominform resolution, adopted in November 1949, stated:

The struggle against the Tito clique of hired spies and murderers is the international duty of all Communists and Workers' Parties. It is the duty of Communist and Workers' Parties to give all possible aid to the Yugoslav working class and working peasantry who are fighting for the return of Yugoslavia to the camp of democracy and socialism.

These resolutions by the Cominform, these demands for revolt by the highest officials of the Soviet Government and the other countries listed in the Yugoslav complaint, certainly constitute aggressive pressure. They constitute threats to the political independence of Yugoslavia within the meaning of article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter.

Furthermore, how does this aggressive pressure against Yugoslavia square with the Soviet regime's self-appointed role as the world's champion of "peace"?

#### **Treaty Violations by Mass Deportation**

My delegation is prepared also to comment on certain specific treaty violations charged by Yugoslavia. These charges are consistent with our own experience regarding treaty violations by the states of Eastern Europe.

I refer to the charges concerning the removal of Yugoslav minorities from border areas east of the Yugoslav frontier where they had lived for centuries, particularly in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

Mass deportations have taken place in distinct violation of human-rights provisions of the peace treaties concluded with these Governments by the Allied and Associated Powers. These treaties bind the Rumanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian Governments to secure for all persons under their jurisdiction, regardless of race, sex, language, or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

This very year, the Rumanian Government began the mass evacuation of families living in the Yugoslav frontier region. The deportation involved some several thousands of people, mainly Serbs and other nonRumanian groups, although Rumanians were also included. The deportees were moved to the eastern parts of Rumania and told to shift for themselves.

Recently the world was shocked to learn of the forced deportation of thousands of people from Budapest by the Hungarian Communist regime. The United States regards this action as a flagrant violation of the human rights provisions of the peace treaty with Hungary.

Furthermore, last year the General Assembly itself condemned the Governments of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria for failing to fulfill their treaty obligations in connection with the human rights provisions of peace treaties.

This, however, is only a small part—admittedly a tragic part—of the whole grim chapter of forced deportations which has been written by the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe since they seized power. The truth of the matter is that throughout the Soviet orbit literally hundreds of thousands of people have been uprooted and moved about in trucks and cattle cars, either within their own country or across national frontiers.

There is another and particularly dangerous treaty violation charged by Yugoslavia which my Government can sustain. That is the Yugoslav contention that the Governments of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria are violating the military provisions of the peace treaties signed with the Allied and Associated Powers.

According to our estimates, the combined armed forces of these three Cominform states are more than twice as large as the quarter of a million men permitted under the peace treaties. Furthermore, these forces have been qualitatively improved with modern military equipment, weapons, and training.

The existence of these large and growing military forces, equipped for offensive action, is certainly contributing to the tension of the Balkans area. We may properly ask why these Governments have gone back on their solemn treaty commitments, against whom are they raising such large military forces, and with the encouragement of what foreign interests?

#### **Pressure on Diplomatic Representation**

I would also like to deal briefly with the Yugoslav charge that the seven governments have indulged in discriminatory practices against Yugoslav diplomats, that they have made it impossible to solve even the most insignificant disputes through diplomatic channels, and have jeopardized the normal maintenance of diplomatic relations.

Here again, Mr. Chairman, we are dealing with a general pattern of conduct characteristic of the Cominform states.

The experience of Yugoslav diplomats in Eastern Europe is similar to the treatment received in that area by the diplomatic representatives of other governments, including the United States. Year by year we have been forced to reduce our staffs to the point at which the maintenance of our diplomatic missions has become increasingly difficult.

Our local employees have been intimidated and forced to leave us. The movements of our official diplomatic representatives have been restricted. The Bulgarian and Albanian regimes made it impossible for the United States to maintain diplomatic missions at all, and we were forced to suspend relations.

My Government also can comment with sympathy on the Yugoslav charges concerning the mistreatment of Yugoslav nationals in the Cominform countries. U.S. diplomatic missions and consular offices in the Cominform countries encounter many obstacles in carrying out their duties to protect American citizens.

These citizens are regularly denied access to their diplomatic and consular representatives. In some cases they have mysteriously disappeared or been subjected to spurious trials. In numerous cases they have had foreign nationalities thrust upon them through threats, chicanery, false promises, or other forms of pressure. They experience severe difficulties in obtaining exit visas from the Cominform countries.

The difficulty of maintaining normal diplomatic relations with the Cominform countries, their will-



ful violation of treaties, the building up of their military power, their aggressive propaganda—these are all parts of what has now become a familiar picture.

When all of these demonstrations of hostility are brought together, combined and focused on a single country, they are clearly aggressive pressure against the prospective victim, in this case Yugoslavia. They run directly counter to the Charter principles of self-determination, national sovereignty, and independence. It is the right and duty of the Assembly to consider these charges under articles 10, 11, and 14 of the Charter.

#### **U. S. Supports Principles of the Charter**

Many countries have viewed this situation with growing concern. My own country, at the request of the Yugoslav Government, has provided economic assistance and is now providing military assistance to Yugoslavia.

The United States is providing this assistance, Mr. Chairman, despite the obvious fact that Yugoslavia has a Communist regime and despite the fact that the people of the United States oppose through tradition and in principle the system of communism. We are providing assistance in order to strengthen the ability of Yugoslavia to defend itself, as it defended itself so valiantly during World War II.

The Soviet Union is a Communist state, but when it had its back to the wall as a result of Nazi aggression, my country provided substantial assistance. In the Soviet case, as in the present case, the fundamental principles of national independence and territorial integrity were involved. These principles, set forth so clearly in the Charter, the United States has always supported.

It is the refusal of the Soviet regime to honor these principles that has brought this matter—and many other matters—before us. Yugoslavia's difficulties grow out of the fact that the Soviet regime insists on absolute and total control of those states where Communist regimes have seized power.

Generalissimo Stalin himself once put it this way: "A revolutionary is he who without arguments, unconditionally is ready to defend and strengthen the U.S.S.R."

In other words, it is not enough to be a Communist, to subscribe to the doctrines of Marx and Lenin, or to set up the institutions of the Soviet type of state. Absolute, unconditional subservience and willingness to take orders are demanded. The Yugoslav Government insisted on a measure of equality and independence.

At that moment it became—in the language of one Soviet note to Yugoslavia—"the enemy and opponent of the Soviet Union."

We are not concerned here with the split in the Cominform or its repercussions throughout the international Communist movement. We are con-

cerned with international peace and security and the principles of the Charter.

For the Charter defends the principle of the sovereign equality of states. It does not recognize that double standard of equality invoked in certain quarters of the world today by which "all states are equal, but some states are more equal than others."

In our view, relationships within the international community should be based, not on coercion and exploitation, but on cooperation and partnership.

We believe, Mr. Chairman, that the resolution submitted by the Yugoslav delegation is reasonable and deserves our support. It properly recalls the purpose of the Charter to develop friendly relations among nations, based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

#### **U.N. Seeks To Lessen Tension in Balkan Area**

It also notes that the Yugoslav Government is ready to contribute on its part all that is necessary to carry out the recommendations of the resolution. These recommendations apply to all the governments concerned. They call for conduct in accordance with the spirit of the Charter and established practices in international relations.

Finally, the resolution recommends the settlement of border disputes by means of mixed border commissions, or other peaceful means. According to our understanding, mixed commissions of this sort are familiar and traditional instruments in the Balkans for the peaceful solution of frontier problems.

If all the governments involved adhere to the letter and spirit of the resolution, there is no reason why there cannot quickly be a reduction in tension between Yugoslavia and the seven Cominform states.

In the meantime, the United Nations is in a position to watch the general situation in the Balkans. Fortunately this Committee has just approved the establishment of a small Balkan subcommission under the Peace Observation Commission.

If requested by any state or states directly concerned, this subcommission can immediately send observers into the area. This subcommittee will be authorized to consider data submitted to it by its members or observers, and to make reports to the Peace Observation Commission and the Secretary-General for the information of member states.

In this way, the United Nations will have immediately available a body equipped to observe and report on any situation endangering the peace in the Balkans which might be called to its attention by states in that region.

But it may be that the services of the Balkan subcommission will not be needed. Let us hope that this proves to be the case. Let us hope that the resolution before us has the general effect of lessening tension in the area. It is one of those

situations of tension of which many members have spoken in this Assembly, and which delay the larger settlements of peace. It is one which the Soviet Union can alleviate, if it really desires to do so.

There need be no victor nor vanquished as the

result of the settlement of the situation which has arisen between Yugoslavia and the seven countries listed in its complaint. Let the victory, if there is any, be won by the Charter. For that would be in the interests of all the parties, and of the United Nations as a whole.

## Advances in Assisting Underdeveloped Areas

*Statements by Mike J. Mansfield  
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly*

### REVIEW OF PROBLEMS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT<sup>1</sup>

One of the most important goals embodied in the Charter of the United Nations is the human objective. This objective is expressed in terms of jobs, conditions of work, and standards of living. All of these are things which go to determine the welfare of peoples around the world. In other words, a basic objective of the United Nations is general improvement of economic and social conditions everywhere.

The condition of people in need has always been a matter of humanitarian concern to the individual citizens of the United States. Furthermore, as a Nation, they are convinced that only through economic and social improvement can the world achieve those conditions under which free governments can be maintained, unrest decreased, and war banished. They are convinced that the only solid foundation upon which we can build security is world-wide economic advancement. They know that otherwise we would be building on quicksand.

Our concern with the economic development of other countries has expressed itself not merely in the form of suggestion or exhortation or persuasion. Our interest has been demonstrated by our performance—a performance which has taken the form of large amounts invested in underdeveloped areas by our private citizens and by the Government, both directly and through the United Nations and specialized agencies.

The General Assembly has already agreed that the economic development of the underdeveloped areas of the world must rest primarily on the efforts of the people of those areas. I note that

the Economic Commission for Latin America has also wisely placed great emphasis on the need for the people of Latin America to increase the rate of their domestic capital formation, to provide incentives for the promotion of domestic savings, and to direct their savings into activities which will help to increase production and productivity.

We have recognized the crucial importance of external assistance in furthering the development programs of people who are determined to help themselves. The need for such external assistance has long been appreciated by the Government of the United States. In 1950 this recognition was embodied in our national legislation when the Congress of the United States declared that it is "the policy of the United States to aid the efforts of the peoples of the underdeveloped areas to develop their resources and improve their working conditions."

During the past 6 years, the U.S. Government has made available over 5½ billion dollars in the form of loans or grants to countries in underdeveloped areas. This figure does not include our paid-in subscription of 635 million dollars to the International Bank. Nor does it include the contributions which we have made to the many U.N. programs which have directly and indirectly assisted in the improvement of economic and social conditions in underdeveloped areas.

During the 12 months ending June 30, 1951, alone, the U.S. Government made grants of over a quarter of a billion dollars for technical and economic assistance to underdeveloped areas. This figure does not include our economic assistance to Greece, Turkey, and Korea.

Underdeveloped areas have also generally benefited from the rapid recovery of Western Europe from the ravages of war. The industries of Western Europe have again become important markets for the raw materials of the underdeveloped coun-

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from a statement made before Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Nov. 20 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

tries. Western Europe has, in turn, been able to send increasing amounts of capital equipment and other manufactured goods to these areas.

Of the 5½ billion dollars made available to underdeveloped areas during the past 6 years by the United States, almost 1½ billion dollars was made available by the U.S. Export-Import Bank. This assistance has been in the form of loans for economic development purposes to Latin America, the Near East, Africa, and Asia. During the past fiscal year, that is, from July 1950 to July 1951, the Bank loaned over 395 million dollars. Of this amount over 96 percent went to underdeveloped countries. Under the Bank's charter, these advances were made for projects which could not be financed through normal commercial channels.

The need of underdeveloped areas for basic facilities in such fields as transportation, power, communications, education, and public health, as a springboard for attaining higher standards of living, has been frequently stressed in the debates of every U.N. agency. The Economic and Social Council, at its eleventh session, made a number of recommendations designed to further the financing of this type of project by governmental and intergovernmental credit agencies.

#### **The Role of Private Investment**

The importance placed on basic development projects by the Export-Import Bank is particularly evident in its recent operations. During the first 6 months of 1951, the Export-Import Bank extended credits to assist in financing power development in Cuba; road construction and improvement in the Republic of Liberia; a water-supply project and a sewage system for the city of Monrovia; diesel-electric locomotives for the railways of Uruguay and Colombia; improvement of airports in Ecuador; and equipment, materials, and services for the development of the Artibonite Valley in Haiti. The largest single item in the Artibonite Valley project will be the construction of a dam for flood control and irrigation storage, with provision for the later installation of electric power generating facilities.

I am sure that members of this committee will not have failed to note how many of these projects fall into the category of what have been described as non-self-liquidating projects.

It is the accepted policy of the U.S. Government that private investment can and should play an important role in economic development. Admittedly, the outflow of American private investment to underdeveloped areas in recent years had been disappointingly small in relation to need. In the recent past, the existence of many uncertainties has had a dampening effect upon the willingness of private investors to place their capital abroad. Yet it is worth noting that, in the face of these risks, the net outflow of private U.S. capital to underdeveloped areas during the 5 years from 1946

through 1950 has amounted to almost 3 billion 500 million dollars.

The U.S. Government has attempted by various means to stimulate the flow of private capital to underdeveloped areas. These have included such measures as investment treaties, treaties for the avoidance of double taxation, tax credits, and government guarantees against risks of inconvertibility and expropriation. It is our intention to implement, to the greatest extent possible, the detailed recommendations of the thirteenth session of the Economic and Social Council which look toward encouraging international private investment in underdeveloped countries. Only last month, the U.S. Congress revised our internal revenue laws to eliminate further the double taxation of American foreign investments.

Despite the heavy burden being borne by every American family as the result of Communist aggression in Korea and the danger of further aggression against the free world, the American people are determined to continue helping the people of the underdeveloped areas to further their economic and social progress. They recognize that the defense of the free world rests not only on armaments but also on greater productivity, equity in the distribution of income, economic and social progress, moral strength, and unity of ultimate purpose.

To implement this determination, our Congress recently increased the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank an additional 1 billion dollars. This brings the basic lending capacity of the Bank up to 4½ billion dollars at the present time. In addition, we appropriated last month 400 million dollars to support a widespread program of economic and technical assistance to agriculture and industry in the Near East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. These funds are to be made available almost entirely on a grant basis.

Under this legislation, President Truman has announced the inauguration of a widespread program of aid for the Near East and has appointed a special representative to coordinate economic and technical assistance in this area. In inaugurating this expanded program, the President expressed the hope that it would lead to new levels of production in both agriculture and industry with benefits to the welfare and security of all the peoples of this important area. Similar programs will shortly be inaugurated in other areas.

#### **Assistance by the International Bank**

In addition to its own instrumentalities, the Government of the United States has always looked to the International Bank as a major instrument for assisting in the financing of economic development of underdeveloped countries. Shortly after its inauguration, my Government authorized the International Bank to use the entire amount of our paid-in subscription for lend-



ing purposes. By amendments to our banking and security laws, we facilitated access by the Bank to the private-capital market in the United States.

During the last fiscal year ending June 30, the International Bank made 21 loans totaling almost 300 million dollars for development projects in 11 countries. As the Bank pointed out in its last annual report, this is the largest number of loans, as well as the largest sum it has made available in any one fiscal year, since beginning its operations. Additional loans, totaling over 110 million dollars have been made during the last 3 months. This brings the Bank's total lending to date to almost 11¼ billion dollars.

The Bank has recently been concentrating on basic development projects. These include agricultural production in the Belgian Congo; electric-power development in Brazil, Colombia, Iceland, Yugoslavia, and Uruguay; road and port development and railway improvement in Australia, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Turkey; flood control and irrigation in Iraq and Thailand; and grain-storage facilities in Nicaragua and Turkey.

It is also making loans to help finance additional imports which are necessitated by the increased economic activity resulting from development programs. Loans of this type were advocated by the Economic and Social Council at its eleventh session. Only recently the Bank announced a credit to the Italian Government for this very purpose. Under this arrangement, the Italian Government will finance a 10-year program for the economic development of southern Italy from its own resources. This program should create greater economic activity and employment. The resulting increased income is expected to create increased demand for goods from abroad. The credits made available by the Bank will assist Italy to pay for such imports. Thus, the Bank is taking concrete steps to encourage member countries to make maximum use of their domestic resources.

One of the great recent advances in international cooperation has been almost universal acceptance of world-wide responsibility for helping peoples to help themselves. We are all familiar with the work of missionaries of all faiths who were pioneers in helping the peoples of underdeveloped areas to improve their ways of living. Private organizations and institutions have for years carried on programs costing millions of dollars annually.

On a governmental level, we have given living expression to this responsibility through our bilateral technical-assistance programs. We have also supported and contributed to the expanded technical-assistance program of the United Nations. We expanded our bilateral program about a year ago. During the first year of the expanded program, almost 500 requests for technical assistance were approved. By last August, programs

were under way in 36 countries in every part of the world. Provision had been made for the employment of over 1,200 technical experts in this field. In addition, 872 training grants had been approved for trainees to study in the United States. These trainees came from 41 countries.

Equally impressive is the record of the United Nations and the specialized agencies in the field of technical assistance. During the past year, the number of fellowships, scholarships, and other training opportunities offered by them totaled at least 2,000. A steadily increasing number of projects are getting under way. Under the United Nations expanded technical-assistance program alone, 311 agreements had been signed with recipient countries as of September of this year. Five hundred and forty experts had been recruited. Under this program a DDT-spraying operation in Afghanistan has been completed. It covered an area exceeding 800 square miles. This operation has resulted in a dramatic decline in the incidence of malaria. In Thailand, a broad scheme based on the recommendations of a consultative commission for reorganizing the entire educational system is under way. In Ethiopia, where rinderpest has been rampant, a mass immunization program has saved more than half a million cattle. Usually this disease is 90 percent fatal. In El Salvador and Libya, the United Nations has been engaged in training public administrators. I need not emphasize the importance of efficient public administration to this Assembly.

Among other direct contributions to economic development which might or might not be considered as technical assistance, I should like to refer to the very useful studies made by the Secretariat in such fields as the mobilization of domestic capital. We should not overlook the assistance which is being given to various countries through seminars or otherwise, surveying their total economic resources, and in presenting well-worked-out development schemes to financing institutions. I should like to mention also the contributions which the regional economic commissions are making to the problems of economic development within their own areas. The United Nations may be justly proud of the achievements of its technical-assistance program during its short life. But may I repeat what our Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, has already observed in this Assembly: All of this is merely a beginning.

#### **Results of the Assistance Program**

We have been talking about loans, grants, experts, and research, and most important of all, the efforts of the underdeveloped countries themselves. What have been the results of these loans, these grants, the experts that have been made available, the research, and the efforts of the people of the underdeveloped countries? The most graphic

answer to this question has been given to us in the official figures of the United Nations.

Let us take electricity—one of the basic factors in our modern economy. Production of electricity in the Philippines in 1937 amounted to 10.9 million kilowatt-hours per month. By January 1951, production amounted to almost 41 million kilowatt-hours. In India, production of electricity totaled 345 million kilowatt-hours in 1947, 425 million in 1950, and 505 million in May 1951. In Morocco, the monthly figure was 14.8 million kilowatt-hours in 1940, and 52 million in January of 1951.

The production of cement is a basic requirement in any expanding economy. What is the story here? Brazil, which in 1940 produced 62 thousand metric tons per month, produced 111 thousand tons in January 1951. The monthly output of cement in India in 1940 was 145 million tons. In May of this year she produced 264 thousand.

Let us look at the story of iron and steel. In 1946 Chile produced 1.8 thousand metric tons of crude steel per month; by April 1951 monthly productions had increased to almost 15 thousand tons. During the last 6 years, Brazil increased her monthly output of crude steel from 17.2 to almost 74 thousand tons. During the same period, India increased her pig-iron output from 119 to 176 thousand tons.

In the field of general manufacturing industries, the index of industrial production in Chile in 1940 stood at 115; by April of this year it had risen to 213. In Mexico, the corresponding figure for 1940 was 99. In 1950, it was 180.

### Effects of the Defense Program

These, then, have been some of the accomplishments in the field of economic development since the war. But people are concerned with the possible effects of the present emergency. They are worried as to how far the urgencies of defense will delay progress towards a better life. They are worried as to what extent they will have to shelve their plans for improving health, education, industry and agriculture, working conditions, and standards of living.

As far as the Government of the United States is concerned, our policy for meeting these needs of humanity was clearly enunciated by President Truman in his address to the joint meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund on September 10. The President said:

The defense program of the free nations will create some difficulties. There will be shortages of certain capital goods. But we must not slacken our efforts to create new sources of wealth, and thereby bring about higher standards of living in the economically underdeveloped areas.

The cause of freedom to which we are dedicated will not permit us to fall behind in this effort.

The economic resources of the free nations, taken together, are sufficient to provide both military security and economic progress.

As we move forward with our defense effort, we should do everything possible to increase the prosperity and raise the standards of living of the free nations. We should remember that this is one of the greatest positive goals of the United Nations.

We have not joined together for purely defensive purposes. We are not an association for preserving things as they are. Our objectives are to secure peace and to create better lives for all people in the world.

Our answer to those who say that economic development will be a casualty of the defense program is a clear and emphatic "no."

But this does not mean that in these critical times we can accomplish all that we would wish in the field of economic development. As our representative in the Economic and Social Council recently pointed out, the immediate need for stronger defenses and the greatly increased strain on the resources of the free world make it necessary to reappraise and, in some cases, to alter some of our assistance programs. In some respects, we shall not be able to go as fast as we would like in aiding others, just as we cannot make progress as rapidly as we should like within our own country.

The needs of defense production are forcing the free countries of the world—developed and underdeveloped—to subject economic development to the same limitations as other phases of our economic life. In the United States, these limitations have taken the form of priority controls over production and consumption. In operating these controls, it is our policy to take into account the requirements of other countries. The criteria we use in determining priorities obviously must place greatest weight on defense production. But I wish to emphasize that these criteria include the maintenance and necessary expansion of essential services and production facilities both at home and abroad.

In other words, we consider the economic development of underdeveloped areas to be an essential feature of the program to strengthen the free world. We intend to continue to support foreign-development programs and projects through the provision of capital goods, as well as technical and financial assistance. This continued support will be subject to two primary requirements—the direct defense of the free nations and the maintenance of the basic economies of the free nations—both developed and underdeveloped.

In implementing our policy of supporting foreign economic development, we are evolving a set of standards for use in allocating materials and goods for export. Under our controlled materials plan, definite allocations of steel, copper, and aluminum have been made for export to foreign countries both in raw and fabricated forms. Machinery has been created for making sure that our allocating authorities will give foreign requirements simultaneous consideration with domestic

requirements. Specific agencies of our Government have been designated as official claimants for the requirements of foreign countries for items in short supply. And may I emphasize that these procedures for submitting claims of foreign countries are identical with those for screening the claims of agencies responsible for our own military requirements and the needs of our civilian population. A special division has been organized in the National Production Authority for the purpose of considering the capital-goods requirements of essential foreign projects. Once such requirements for essential foreign projects are approved they carry automatic priority ratings and obtain the necessary certificates to permit delivery.

High priority has been given to applications for material required for foreign public health and public utilities projects. Among other projects for which assistance has been given are port and railroad development in the Belgian Congo, irrigation projects in Mexico and India, and a hydro-electric power project in El Salvador.

Despite shortages of many types of capital goods, the volume of U. S. exports of manufactured goods during the second quarter of 1951 was 25 percent above the corresponding period of 1950. Our exports of manufactured goods were 44 percent greater. Based upon data available to date, our 1951 exports of metals, metal products, machinery, and chemicals will show increases ranging from 18 to 61 percent in value over 1950. Although a part of this increase reflects increases in prices, a large part reflects actual increases in physical quantities.

The greatest increases in our exports of certain types of capital goods were to underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This has been particularly true of our exports of mining, well and pumping machinery, as well as tractors. During 1951 the value of tractor parts and accessories exported to these areas increased by 46 percent over 1950. Exports of agricultural machinery and implements rose by 33 percent; mining, well and pumping machinery by 35 percent; electric machinery and apparatus by 23 percent; automobiles and automobile parts by 58 percent. In physical quantities, we are shipping more capital goods and equipment to underdeveloped countries than in 1950. We are shipping them a larger percentage of our total exports of such goods than in 1950.

These are the efforts being made by the United States to assist the underdeveloped countries in getting a fair share of our production. But foreign governments and foreign buyers can also help us in these efforts by assigning appropriate priorities to their various development programs. The presentation of well-documented cases to our allocating and export licensing authorities will enable us more quickly to fulfill requests for assistance. Such procedures on their part will go a long way towards insuring the most effective dis-

tribution of our production between foreign and domestic requirements.

I turn now to the extensive resolution on the financing of economic development which the Council has adopted in response to the fifth Assembly's request that further study be given this problem. During the past year, there was made available to us a report on "Measures for the Economic Development of the Underdeveloped Countries." This report was submitted by a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General. They recommended, among other things, that a new international organization be established to provide grant assistance for financing basic projects.

#### **Financial Support for Basic Economic Development Projects**

The problem of financing the basic requirements of economic development raises two questions. The first concerns the extent to which grants are necessary. The second concerns the instrumentalities through which such grants are to be made available.

As to the first question—the extent to which grants are necessary to finance basic projects—both the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank have indicated willingness to make loans for projects which contribute only indirectly to increased productivity. In fact, both institutions have extended many loans for projects of this character. To be sure, they have not always been able to help finance such projects, particularly where the prospective servicing capacity was too limited. However, this should be less true in the immediate future. The balance-of-payments position of most underdeveloped countries has been measurably improved. Underdeveloped countries, generally, are, therefore, in a better position to finance nonbankable projects with their own resources, or, alternatively, to assume larger debt obligations in order to accelerate investment in this type of project.

Nevertheless, we recognize that some countries, particularly the least developed, may sometimes require a measure of external grant assistance to provide an initial impetus to basic development. This recognition has been embodied in the resolution of the Economic and Social Council which is before us.

As to the instruments through which financial assistance should be made available, it is the view of my Government that it would be neither practicable nor feasible to establish an international agency for the purpose of distributing grants. No new organization will be a truly international institution unless a sufficient number of countries is prepared to make effective and significant contributions to its operations. It would seem extremely unlikely that countries, which in the past have been capital-exporting countries, would now be in a position to export additional capital in any large volume.



We all know that even in the case of subscription to the International Bank most countries have found it impossible to permit any extensive use for lending purposes of that part of their contribution which has been made in national currencies. I should also like to remind the members of this committee of the very real difficulties that the Negotiating Committee established by the last General Assembly experienced in obtaining contributions for Korea and Palestine. In these circumstances, in my opinion, it would be quite unrealistic and impracticable to assume that there would be a wide and substantial participation in any agency organized for the purpose of giving grant assistance. Without such wide and substantial participation, such an institution would not be truly international in character.

This does not mean, obviously, that the possibility of obtaining grant assistance by underdeveloped areas is foreclosed. Grant assistance has been available for economic development over recent years. The indications are that it will continue to be so. It is the considered view of my Government that grant aid can be effectively made available in the foreseeable future without creating a new international agency.

The experts appointed by the Secretary-General also recommended that we explore the establishment of an international cooperation to promote the financing of productive private enterprise in underdeveloped countries. The Economic and Social Council has requested the International Bank to examine this possibility. Such an analysis will be extremely useful.

The U.S. delegation is of the opinion that the resolution of the Economic and Social Council on the financing of economic development is a reasonable and satisfactory response to the request of the General Assembly. We look forward with interest to the further reports which the Council will make to us.

I have reviewed some of the many important things which have been going on in the field of economic development. I have also tried to indicate some of the problems which we face today, as well as some of the accomplishments we may look forward to in the future. I have tried to make clear our determination to help carry forward the fight against poverty, hunger, ignorance, and disease as vigorously as possible, in the face of present rearmament burdens and prospective difficulties. Unfortunately, what we can do now is sharply limited by the cost of maintaining defenses to prevent aggression and war. If that cost could be reduced, if the burden of rearmament could be lessened, new energy and new resources would be liberated for greatly enlarged programs of reconstruction and development.

If I may quote the words of the President of the United States:

If the rulers of the Soviet Union did not drown their words of peace with the drums of war, if their professions

of peaceful intent were matched by deeds, the Century in which we live could become the brightest man has known upon this earth. For our part, if peace could be made sure, the American people would be glad to invest a part of the resources we must now allocate to defense to a large-scale program of world-wide economic development.

The benefits of such a program would be immense; the cost a small part of what we must now pay to build our defenses at home and abroad. With such a program, we could, in cooperation with other peoples, inaugurate the most hopeful and fruitful period of peaceful development the world has ever seen.

This was our vision six years ago, when the war came to a close. Let us never forget it. And let us never give up our hopes and our efforts to make this vision a reality.

#### **COORDINATION NEEDED TO MAKE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE EFFECTIVE<sup>1</sup>**

Since we met last year in the General Assembly, the organizational stage of the expanded program of technical assistance has, to a large extent, been completed. Work is now being carried on in nearly 40 countries. The U.S. Government takes great satisfaction in the successful initiation of this program by the United Nations. We feel that this program, in the United Nations and in the specialized agencies, should be regarded as a permanent part of the work of the United Nations' system.

As I have already said, we feel that the initiation by the United Nations of the technical-assistance program represents one of the most significant advances in the field of international cooperation in this century. The almost universal acceptance—I regret that I cannot say universal—of the responsibility of each country for helping other countries to help themselves through the United Nations is a milestone in the world's progress. I have been impressed by the satisfaction expressed by almost all of my colleagues with the U.N. program. I am sorry that the delegate of the U.S.S.R. and certain of his colleagues have felt unable to give the support of their countries to these programs.

The excellent results already achieved in the short life of the program testify to the greater accomplishments which we may expect in the future. For example, the Food and Agriculture Organization is now engaged in a cotton project in Afghanistan which already promises to triple the production of cotton in that area. The United Nations last summer ran a seminar on public administration in El Salvador which was attended by well over half of the public officials of that country, and by officials from neighboring countries. Techniques of office management, budgeting, and modern administration were discussed. I need not refer to the results already achieved by the World Health Organization in attacking malaria in Greece and India.

<sup>1</sup> Made in Committee II on Dec. 1 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

One of the most significant aspects of the U.N. programs is their cooperative nature. So many countries are making their contributions to help many other countries. To mention a few examples, a Canadian agricultural director is helping Ethiopia increase its food supply; a fishery expert from the Netherlands is in Pakistan directing the construction of a fish harbor; a Peruvian health expert is in Egypt working on the control of plague for that whole region; and an educator from New Zealand has established a teacher-training center in Thailand; and a Swedish cooperative leader is in Iran helping to develop production and consumer cooperatives. In this way the United Nations is drawing upon the skills of one nation to help in the development of another nation just as in the United States the more advanced states have contributed technical skills to the less advanced states, to the profit of all.

I am proud to recall the role of President Truman in making my country one of the original proponents of this great cooperative effort to raise

standards of living. But I want to pay tribute to the other 54 nations which met in June 1950 and pledged the funds to support this program. I want to congratulate the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his staff, and the staffs of the specialized agencies, who have put flesh and blood into the resolution of the Economic and Social Council and of this Assembly. I want to commend the hundreds of technicians who are serving in this United Nations' program. This is truly an *action* program.

The United States looks forward to the rapid development and extension of the program in the field during 1952, and we will contribute to its support. We hope that the 54 other governments who contributed to the program last year will contribute again this year. And we hope that other governments who have not yet contributed will do so.

While on the question of contributions, I should like to refer to what was done by the Economic and Social Council with regard to the expanded

### U.S. Draft Resolution on Aid to Underdeveloped Countries

UN doc. A/C.2/L.85 Dated Dec. 1, 1951

#### The General Assembly

1. *Believing* that the technical assistance programs of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies are of basic importance to economic development and to effective international cooperation to raise standards of living in underdeveloped countries,

2. *Recognizing* that governments requesting technical assistance have primary responsibility for planning and carrying out their own programs of economic and social development, and therefore, are responsible for strengthening their own internal machinery to coordinate the planning of development measures, for formulating integrated programs of development, including priorities, and for taking into account the possibilities of financing such development projects as may be recommended by technical assistance missions,

3. *Recognizing* the great importance of close collaboration between agencies giving technical and financial assistance,

4. *Notes* with satisfaction the progress already achieved in putting the expanded program into operation, and the collaboration which has been developing between agencies giving technical and financial assistance with regard to particular projects;

5. *Notes* the action taken and arrangements made by the Economic and Social Council concerning the expanded program at its 13th Session (Res. 400 (XIII)).

6. *Requests* that negotiations of contributions for the second financial period of the expanded program of Technical Assistance be carried out by any negotiating committee for extra-budgetary funds established during the present session of the General Assembly.

7. *Requests* the Secretary General:

(a) Subject to the provisions of any other resolutions adopted by this Assembly concerning the pledging of extra-budgetary funds to convene a conference for the purpose of ascertaining the total amount of contributions for the second financial

period available from the participating governments for the execution of the technical assistance programs of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies.

(b) To invite to the Conference with the right to vote all members of the United Nations and all other Governments members of the Specialized Agencies participating in the program; and likewise to invite, without the right to vote, Representatives of the Specialized Agencies.

8. *Approves* the financial arrangements set forth in Annex A hereto for the administration of the funds contributed, as agreed by the Economic and Social Council in Resolution 400 (XIII Pgh. 7).

9. *Calls on* the Specialized Agencies participating in the expanded technical assistance program, to provide information concerning their estimates for the expenditure of technical assistance funds in their regular budget documents; and to transmit to the General Assembly, for examination and approval, the audit reports relating to expenditure of technical assistance funds allocated from the Special Account after approval of the appropriate audit reports by the general conferences of their agencies.

10. *Expresses* the hope that governments which are not members of the United Nations but are members of participating Specialized Agencies will attend the Conference mentioned above, and that they will associate themselves with the financial and other arrangements mentioned above.

11. *Urges* all Governments to make contributions to the program for the year 1952 at least equal to the contributions which they made for the first financial period.

12. *Requests* the Secretary General, the Economic and Social Council, and the Specialized Agencies to take all possible measures to assure that technical assistance rendered is consistent with, and makes the maximum contribution to, integrated plans of economic and social development.

13. *Looks forward* to increased collaboration between the agencies furnishing technical assistance and financing agencies so that maximum coordination between technical and financial assistance can be obtained.

program at its thirteenth session. The Council considered at length and agreed upon financial arrangements for the administration of the program for 1952. These are set forth in the annex to our proposed resolution. We feel that these arrangements are sound and should be carried out. It will be noted that, in paragraph 10 of our proposal, we express the hope that the contributing governments who are not members of the United Nations will also approve these arrangements. In paragraph 9, we incorporate, for the sake of completeness, some additional financial provisions which were set up by this Assembly last year in resolution 411 (V).

The Council last summer also approved the participation in the expanded program of the International Telecommunication Union and the World Meteorological Organization. We welcome their participation and we feel that the Council acted appropriately and within its authority in approving their admission.

The Council's Technical Assistance Committee recommended that the Secretary-General and the participating organizations interpret the rules regarding the provision of supplies and equipment more generously and asked the Technical Assistance Board to study this matter. The United States welcomes this decision on the part of the Committee.

The Committee also set up a Working Party for the purpose of studying ways and means whereby the activities of the organizations participating in the expanded program might be more effectively coordinated and the program more effectively administered. We hope that the member governments will comply with the request to send their suggestions in writing to the Secretary-General before the end of this year for consideration by the Working Party.

The success of the technical-assistance program will depend to a large extent upon the soundness of the plans of requesting governments and the use they make of available technical assistance. I am sure that we will all agree that a series of unrelated projects, in various unrelated fields, even though each project is extremely valuable in itself, will not necessarily constitute an effective technical-assistance program for the economic and social development of an area.

Consequently, each government requesting technical assistance should, insofar as possible, formulate its development objectives on the basis of an analysis of its own needs and determine which projects are to be given priority in terms of the financing and personnel which it can contribute. In that way it will be possible for each government to frame its request in the light of these objectives and priorities. In this connection, I wish to emphasize the great value of the assistance the Economic Commission for Latin America is giving to the governments of countries within its region in setting up their long-term development programs.

Equally important is a realistic assessment by each country, in advance of making a request, of the extent of its capacity and willingness to carry out recommendations which may grow out of technical-assistance missions. Only if the requesting government takes this kind of responsibility can technical assistance achieve maximum results.

As I have said already, the Council and the Technical Assistance Committee were greatly concerned with the necessity of coordinating technical-assistance programs. We have made progress in developing methods for the continuing exchange of information and consultation. Coordination, however, must largely be achieved in the country requesting assistance at the time of planning requests. We have been pleased that some governments have taken steps to set up central units or committees to coordinate their requests for technical assistance and also to assure consultation with representatives of technical-assistance agencies operating in the country. These steps are of major importance. They have been extremely helpful and will be found increasingly so.

#### **Coordination Through Technical Assistance Board**

The United States also welcomes the appointment by the Technical Assistance Board of resident technical-assistance representatives who represent the interests of all the participating organizations. These representatives will aid greatly in coordinating the activities of the various U.N. agencies and in assisting the requesting governments in developing coordinated requests.

Getting back, for a moment, to what I have said about the decision of the Technical Assistance Committee with regard to the strengthening of the Board, we believe that the central organization must also play an effective part in assuring that the total expanded program of the United Nations achieves its objectives. The United States, therefore, would like to see the Technical Assistance Board assist the requesting governments and participating organizations in developing coordinated programs and assure that the total program for any country is a balanced one that will have an effective impact on its problems of economic and social development. We hope that the organization of the Technical Assistance Board will be strengthened toward this end.

We expect the Technical Assistance Board to assist the participating organizations in dealing with common problems faced by them all. One such problem is preparing experts for field assignments.

Such preparation in addition to orientation to the technical aspects of the particular project must also include a thorough grounding in the objectives and philosophy of the program as a whole and the contribution of technical assistance in the various specialized fields to a coordinated program of development. Such preparations must also



help to provide a sympathetic awareness of differences among countries and peoples in their ways of living and working. It must provide an understanding of what is involved in adapting the techniques and methods of one country to the particular needs of another country. I am sure that further study of the problems of orientation will result in providing greater assistance to experts in carrying on their important assignments in this program that calls for pioneering and hewing of new paths.

#### **Provisions of U.S. Draft Resolution**

Turning now to the provisions of our proposed resolution dealing with the relationship between the agencies supplying technical assistance and the financing agencies, my Government recognizes that in some cases the recommendations made by the technical-assistance missions cannot be effectively implemented without provision for capital investment. Most of such recommendations require investments involving the expenditure of local funds, but in some cases they may require foreign resources. Consequently, it would be to the advantage of governments, in accordance with the Guiding Principles annexed to the basic resolution governing this program, to present their requests for technical assistance in the light of their over-all development plans, and particularly in the light of their programs and priorities for financing development. In this way governments, when they seek to implement technical-assistance recommendations, will be in a far better position to take the steps necessary to obtain local financing and foreign-loan assistance when the latter is appropriate.

The United States believes that technical-assistance missions might well provide host governments with comprehensive information on the financial as well as on the technical aspects of their recommendations. This should be done particularly in those cases where new investment will be essential to the implementation of recommendations. Such information might include estimates on the probable cost of implementing their recommendations and the availability of needed material and equipment. It should also include estimates of the possible expenditures and revenues to be expected in the operation of the investment. The Fund and the Bank can assist the technical agencies in providing this kind of information.

Close collaboration between the technical-assistance agencies and those giving financial assistance is called for. The United States, therefore, is glad to note such evidences of close collaboration as that between the Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization in the joint seminars which those two institutions, in conjunction with the U.N. regional commissions, have organized on agricultural development planning.

We believe that the Technical Assistance Board can serve as a mechanism to consider requests and projects in the light of the development priorities of the country involved and arrange for the participation of appropriate financial organizations in projects. We hope that there will be a closer working relationship between the U.N. technical-assistance agencies and the financing institutions both within and outside the United Nations—the Bank, the Fund, the Export-Import Bank, and the “Colombo Authorities.” We hope that such relationships can be worked out on terms acceptable to all concerned; terms which will, at the same time, assure to the financing institutions the independence of judgment with regard to specific loans which they must, of course, retain.

Such collaboration involves consultations between the financing organizations and technical-assistance experts prior to their going to the field, with a view to directing the attention of the missions to projects which have a realistic relationship to existing financing plans for the country concerned. It might also involve participation by financing organizations in technical-assistance missions organized by other organizations in the United Nations system. Thus the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank might participate in missions with a view to advising on the relationship between the missions' recommendations and domestic financing.

The U.S. delegation notes with great and sympathetic interest the growing number of particularly significant developments under the expanded program. The 5-year agreement which Bolivia has recently signed with the United Nations to carry out far-reaching recommendations made by a U.N. technical-assistance mission to Bolivia last year represents a very valuable experiment in which Bolivia will make use, in its government service, of internationally recruited personnel. The United States, through its own bilateral technical-assistance program, will do what it can to contribute to the success of this experiment, whose initiation has required daring, unselfishness, and farsighted thinking by both Bolivia and the United Nations. An example of sound program planning has been presented by the Government of Pakistan which has developed a coordinated plan in which technical assistance is used to the best over-all advantage. Another such example is that of Thailand which has developed a similar comprehensive integrated plan. There are many other such examples which might be mentioned.

The technical-assistance program must increasingly reach everybody through extension and educational activities. My delegation, therefore, welcomes projects now underway that are designed to organize the people in local communities for self-help purposes. The Community Development Employment Program and the community welfare centers recommended by the Economic and Social

Council at its last session are examples of this type of project.

The United States looks forward with confidence to sound progress and substantial accomplishment under the expanded program in the year ahead. The U.N. agencies and the member gov-

ernments who are participating in this program can take deep satisfaction in its successful initiation. It is a far-reaching program of great significance in the achievement of the basic U.N. objective of building a better life for the peoples of the world.

## **The U.S. Concept of Agrarian Reform As a Foundation for World Peace**

*Statement by Clifford R. Hope  
U.S. Delegate to the FAO Conference<sup>1</sup>*

[Printed from telegraphic text]

In order to focus attention on the action we think the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) Conference should take on reform of agrarian structure, the U.S. delegation has proposed a resolution outlining the principal ways in which FAO might move forward on the program. The resolution recognizes the importance of agrarian reforms for the achievement of FAO's objectives; recommends full endorsement of the Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) resolution,<sup>2</sup> and urges member governments to act on recommendations of that resolution; suggests a review by the Director General of the program of work with a view to promoting increased emphasis and better integration for all projects in the program of work bearing on agrarian reform in its broadest context; suggests that in considering, or assisting governments on aspects of agrarian reform which are outside the program of work of FAO, such as questions of taxation or agricultural labor, FAO should obtain the cooperation of appropriate United Nations or specialized agencies.

Our resolution recommends that the Director General seek the cooperation of other international organizations, national governments, and private bodies in undertaking investigations suggested by the Director General in his paper on this subject. In this way, many of the studies and investigations which this paper described as "needed to provide an adequate basis for establishment of reform programs" could be carried out in cooperation with FAO, without additional demands on the budget.

It recommends that the Director General give high priority to those technical assistance requests concerned with land tenure, credit, cooperatives,

and other problems related to reform of agrarian structures; recommends that the Director General, in cooperation with other agencies and governments, organize regional meetings or training centers. In this connection we have in mind the experience at the University of Wisconsin seminar, recently attended by some of these delegates present.<sup>3</sup> We feel that FAO could usefully encourage similar programs in various localities.

We have introduced the resolution not with the idea that it is the last or best word on this subject, but as a basis for discussion and action by the Commission and Conference. We hope it will receive widest consideration and that the delegates will suggest additional points to make it more effective in bringing about the kind of action FAO should undertake in this field.

Since my Government has proposed this resolution to the Conference, I believe it would be well for me to say a word about our interest in this question. This interest and the reasons for it have been expressed at the U.N. General Assembly and at the Economic and Social Council, as well as at previous meetings of the Conference and Council of FAO. Now that we have various reports, documents, and resolutions before us, I feel our interest in the subject might well be restated.

Our interest may be considered from several standpoints but I want to mention particularly the economic one of developing increased production, and the social or moral one of developing greater dignity for people who till the soil. We believe we cannot achieve full agricultural production as long as the agrarian structure handicaps farmers by inequitable conditions of tenancy, excessive rents, unduly burdensome taxation, inordinate interest charges and other costs, coupled with inefficient marketing systems. In other words, we

<sup>1</sup> Made on Nov. 24 before Commission I of the sixth session of the FAO Conference at Rome. Mr. Hope is a Member of Congress from Kansas.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1951, p. 473.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1951, p. 660.

feel that the great objectives of FAO cannot be achieved unless a high percentage of the world's farmers have an opportunity to own their own land and operate it under conditions which will enable them to reach maximum production, achieve fair returns and at the same time conserve and rebuild the fertility of the soil for future generations.

In our country we have a saying to the effect that a man will fight for his farm or home but not for a stack of rent receipts. That statement is not as belligerent as it sounds and I mention it now because it points out something of great significance as far as the human race is concerned. It is based on the thought that men everywhere cherish that which is their own, and that there are few human instincts stronger than the desire of men and women to possess a little spot of earth which they can call their own. Farm and home ownership in any nation makes for stability of government. It makes for world peace because a nation of home owners operating under the democratic system of government will be the last in the world to start an aggressive war.

All this fits in with what we seek in international relations, which is real and lasting world peace. All the teachings of history and religion convince us that such a peace can be realized only when all peoples of the world are living under conditions which most fully enhance human dignity. In agriculture, these conditions are best realized when the man who works the soil has an opportunity to own it and to profit from his labor.

Because of the fact that all of us can best discuss that with which we are familiar and because my own country has attempted to deal with land problems and agrarian structure over a period of years, it might be of interest to recount briefly just what we have done. I want to go back to 1862 which is a noteworthy year in our history and especially in our agricultural history.

At that time the Nation was torn asunder by fratricidal war between our States and its future never looked darker. Yet in that year our Congress passed two pieces of legislation of outstanding significance to agriculture. One was the Homestead Act to provide for free homesteads of 160 acres to those who would settle on our public land and bring it into cultivation. The other was the act establishing our land-grant college system from which has sprung our agricultural experiment stations and our extension services upon which our entire system of agricultural education is based. I call your particular attention to the fact that these two great pieces of legislation which have done so much to implement our agricultural policies came together. One recognizes the importance of farm ownership and the other the importance of agricultural education.

I think the two should always go together wherever they are undertaken because each complements and supplements the other. But after our

rural areas had all been settled and there were no longer free homesteads, we began to face the problem of increasing tenancy. This was complicated by a lack of credit suitable for small farmers both for production and marketing purposes. Also, we had serious defects in our marketing system. All these matters were brought to our attention particularly during the depression of the early thirties and the drought years which followed. This resulted in much legislation not only for the purpose of supporting and stabilizing farm prices, but to enable tenants to purchase farms and set up a structure of government and cooperative credit to finance practically all farm operations at a reasonable rate of interest. Also, through our cooperative organizations we improved our marketing system and began a program of rural electrification which is now on the way to completion.

We have not solved all of our problems by any means, but I want you to know that we have problems and that we are making an effort to meet them. We are aware that, as a new country with great natural resources, we have not been confronted with many of the problems which exist in older nations. Every country has its individual problems which require individual solutions, and some of the older countries have gone much farther than we in working out a solution of tenancy and particularly credit problems. We can all benefit from their experience.

If I haven't already done so, I want to make it clear that our concept of agrarian reform becomes something much more than mere breaking up of large estates. Our concept of agrarian reform is a whole series of measures looking toward improving the situation of the man who actually tills the soil. Opportunity to own the land he works is a key part of the concept, but other equally important parts are facilities for obtaining credit on reasonable terms to purchase land and to acquire necessary facilities for agricultural production and improved rural living; facilities for marketing agricultural commodities at a fair return; farm taxes that are not burdensome; opportunity for instruction in the knowledge of improved techniques for agricultural production and rural living; and other measures such as an opportunity to utilize electric power.

We feel that encouragement of genuine cooperatives controlled by individual members is one of the best ways of achieving these essential parts of our concept of land reform. In this connection, I would like to mention one point in the otherwise excellent report of the Secretary-General and FAO which I believe needs clarification.

We detect in this report a failure to note the essential difference between a cooperative as we understand the term and as it is misused in a number of countries which are not members of FAO. A true cooperative means to us exactly what the term implies, an organization formed by in-



dividuals of their own volition for the purpose of performing services which they as individuals are not otherwise able to obtain. We believe that governments should encourage the formation of such cooperatives, provided that control of them rests with individuals who are its members. The term as misused in countries behind the Iron Curtain refers to something altogether different, an organization joined involuntarily, for purposes of state rather than members, and controlled by the state or a single party which controls the state, rather than by individual members. Such organizations are more properly termed "collectives." The report does not make this distinction, and we feel that this should be noted, since it is a distinction which is all-important to the welfare of farmers, to real agricultural advancement, and to a sane and peaceful world.

The action of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in referring this question to FAO is a challenge to the organization which cannot be ignored. It offers to the United States an opportunity to take the leadership in solving some of the most important questions confronting the world today.

The great speech of our Director General on Thursday in which he called upon the Conference to take the leadership in planning for an increase in agricultural production based upon effective planning and vigorous action at the farm level is also a challenge to this organization to meet the great problems involved in reforming agrarian structures where such reform is needed. Because the problems of tenancy, good land use, credit, and all other problems which we have been discussing tie in so closely with efficient production, I think we are justified in concluding that the challenge cannot be fully met unless the organization exercises its opportunity for leadership in bringing about these reforms as rapidly as possible.

In saying this I have in mind the rapid strides which some countries have already made in this direction. They will continue their efforts, of course, and through FAO they can assist others. What is needed now is for all nations to join under FAO's leadership in this great effort to improve the efficiency of agricultural production and the lot of men and women on our farms throughout the world.

#### THE DEPARTMENT

#### Livingston T. Merchant Appointed Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs

The Department of State announced on December 5 the appointment of Livingston T. Merchant of Morristown, N. J., as special assistant to the Secretary for Mu-

tual Security Affairs. Mr. Merchant has, since September 1949, been serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

Mr. Merchant's duties in the newly created position will include the coordination of all activities within the Department relating to programs authorized by the Mutual Security Act of 1951, including, where appropriate, their relation to regional or bilateral arrangements primarily concerned with collective defense or mutual security. He will also be the principal representative of the Department in dealings with the Director for Mutual Security. He will serve as the representative or assure appropriate representation on any interdepartmental committee concerned with assistance programs authorized by the Mutual Security Act.

Mr. Merchant will represent the Department in connection with the activities of the Director for Mutual Security in the preparation and presentation to Congress of the Mutual Security Program legislation. He will assure that all necessary work by the Department is properly performed and coordinated and will assure the establishment and maintenance of effective working relationships with other Government agencies having responsibilities within this area.

#### John M. Allison Designated Acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

On December 7 the Department of State announced the designation of John M. Allison as Acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. Mr. Allison is a veteran Foreign Service career officer having entered the service in 1930. Except for service in London from 1942 to 1945 he has spent his entire career in dealing with Far Eastern matters, a large portion of the time being spent in Japan and China.

Mr. Allison has recently completed his assignment as assistant to John Foster Dulles, with the rank of Minister, during which time he assisted Mr. Dulles in the latter's responsibility for the negotiation of the Japanese peace treaty and the security pacts with New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, and Japan.

#### Appointment of Officer

U. Alexis Johnson as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

#### THE FOREIGN SERVICE

#### George C. McGhee Appointed Ambassador to Turkey

On December 8 the President announced the recess appointment of Assistant Secretary George Crews McGhee of Dallas, Tex., to serve in the dual capacity of United States Ambassador to Turkey and Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Turkey.

The President will send Mr. McGhee's appointment to the Senate for confirmation when the Senate reconvenes in January. Burton Y. Berry, a Foreign Service career officer, of Fowler, Ind., who is now Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs will serve as Acting Secretary until Mr. McGhee's successor is announced and assumes office.

Mr. McGhee succeeds Ambassador George Wadsworth of Buffalo, N. Y., a veteran career officer with 35-years experience in the Middle East, who is returning to Washington prior to reassignment.

**Recent Releases—Continued from page 984**

**Air Force Mission to Chile.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2201. Pub. 4152. 13 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile—Signed at Washington February 15, 1951; entered into force February 15, 1951.

**Naval Mission to Chile.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2202. Pub. 4153. 13 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile—Signed at Washington February 15, 1951; entered into force February 15, 1951.

**Health and Sanitation.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2203. Pub. 4154. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Colombia—Exchange of Notes signed at Bogota September 15 and October 20, 1950; entered into force November 3, 1950; operative retroactively from June 30, 1950.

**Germany-Owned Patents in Italy.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2204. Pub. 4155. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy—Signed at Rome November 29, 1950; entered into force November 29, 1950.

**Cooperative Agricultural Program in Paraguay.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2205. Pub. 4156. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Paraguay—Exchange of notes signed at Asunción September 18 and November 11, 1950; entered into force November 27, 1950; operative retroactively from June 30, 1950.

**Education, Cooperative Program in Paraguay.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2206. Pub. 4157. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Paraguay—Exchange of notes signed at Asunción September 18 and November 11, 1950; entered into force November 22, 1950; operative retroactively from June 30, 1950.

**Termination of Reciprocal Trade Agreement of September 13, 1935.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2207. Pub. 4158. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Colombia—Exchange of notes signed at Washington October 12, 1949; entered into force October 12, 1949.

**Exchange of Official Publications.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2208. Pub. 4159. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia—Exchange of notes signed at Belgrade October 4 and 9, 1950; entered into force October 9, 1950.

**Education, Cooperative Program in Ecuador.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2211. Pub. 4167. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ecuador—Exchange of notes signed at Quito September 15, 1950; entered into force October 26, 1950; operative retroactively from June 30, 1950.

**Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Chile.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2214. Pub. 4169. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile—Exchange of notes signed at Santiago, December 11, 1950, and January 8, 1951; entered into force January 9, 1951; operative retroactively from July 1, 1950.

**Termination of Reciprocal Trade Agreement of May 25, 1935.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2216. Pub. 4179. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Sweden—Signed at Stockholm May 25, 1950; entered into force May 25, 1950.

**Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in El Salvador.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2219. Pub. 4182. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador—Exchange of notes signed at San Salvador November 10 and December 13, 1950; entered into force January 24, 1951; operative retroactively from July 1, 1950.

**Radio Communications Between Amateur Stations on Behalf of Third Parties.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2223. Pub. 4188. 4 pp. 5¢.

Arrangement between the United States and Liberia—Exchange of notes signed at Monrovia November 9, 1950, and January 8, 9, and 10, 1951; entered into force January 11, 1951.

**Vocational Education Mission to El Salvador.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2224. Pub. 4189. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador—Exchange of notes signed at San Salvador January 27 and February 12, 1951; entered into force February 12, 1951.

**Weather Stations: Pacific Ocean Interim Program.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2228. Pub. 4196. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Canada—Exchange of notes dated at Washington September 25, 1950, and February 16, 1951; entered into force February 16, 1951.

**Indochina: The War in Southeast Asia.** Far Eastern Series 50. Pub. 4381. 11 pp. 10¢.

A background summary giving the favorable developments in the past year and the events leading to the forming of the Associated States.

**Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Dec. 3-8, 1951**

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (\*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

No.	Date	Subject
1021	11/15	Rights of nationals in Morocco
1054	11/27	China: Tariff concessions withdrawn
1062	11/29	Dulles: Free East and Free West
1067*	12/3	Exchange of persons
1068*	12/3	Webb: Death of Frank B. Clayton
1069†	12/4	Convention: Safety of life at sea
1070†	12/4	Mission agreement with Uruguay
1071†	12/4	Recorded music from Finland
1072	12/5	Merchant and Johnson appointed
1073*	12/6	Anniversary of Finland
1074	12/6	Dulles: Purpose of return to Japan
1075	12/7	Allison: Acting Secretary Far East
1076	12/8	McGhee: Ambassador to Turkey

## The United States in the United Nations

[December 6-12, 1951]

### General Assembly

The General Assembly December 6, meeting in plenary session for the first time in almost 3 weeks, elected Chile and Pakistan to the Security Council. However, a deadlock, extending over eight secret ballots, developed between the two leading candidates for the remaining vacancy—Greece and Byelorussia and it [the Assembly] was forced to defer action temporarily. China, France, and Belgium were reelected to the Economic and Social Council, and Argentina, Cuba, and Egypt were chosen to fill the three remaining vacancies. Together with the Security Council, the Assembly also selected the following six International Court of Justice judges: Levi Fernandez Carneiro (Brazil), Green Hackworth (U.S.), Helge Klaestad (Norway), Sergei A. Golunsky (U.S.S.R.), Enrique Armand Ugon (Uruguay), and Sir Benegal N. Rau (India). Judges Hackworth and Klaestad were reelected.

Final approval was given to a group of resolutions reported out by the main Committees. Texts discontinuing the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and requesting the Peace Observation Commission to establish a Balkan Subcommission were adopted 48-5 (Soviet bloc)-1 (Guatemala). Approval, 54-5 (Soviet bloc)-1 (Ethiopia), was also given to a recommendation to the Security Council to give urgent consideration to the immediate admission of Italy. Also ratified were the U.S.-U.K. resolution creating a Negotiating Committee on Extra-Budgetary Funds and the Committee VI plan to defer consideration of the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States. A Byelorussian move to invalidate the credentials of the Chinese Nationalist delegation was thwarted 7 (Soviet bloc, Burma, India)-39 (U.S.)-4.

*Committee I (Political and Security)*—The Big Four disarmament subcommittee completed its work December 10 with the adoption of a report to the Political Committee surveying "the areas of agreement, possible agreement and disagreement . . . disclosed and clarified" in the course of its 10-day series of private meetings on the U.S.-U.K.-French resolution and Soviet amend-

ments. While making it clear that "serious divergencies" continued to exist on the main substantive issues involved, the report cited agreement of the possibility of agreement on a number of "points of importance," including establishment under the Security Council of a new 12-member commission to seek further agreement on a disarmament program.

The agreement on the new Commission—to be known as the Commission on Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments—was welcomed in a separate U.S.-U.K.-French statement issued simultaneously with the report. "In the new commission," the statement said, "we can continue to work for agreement on a comprehensive program that will include all types of armaments and armed forces. . . . We regard the task of ending aggression and mass destruction as too important to mankind to permit discouragement."

On December 11 the full Committee resumed its interrupted discussion of the tripartite resolution, with Selwyn Lloyd (U.K.), speaking for the three Western powers, characterizing the talks as a "modest but definite step forward." Both he and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky, who spoke the next day, reviewed the areas of agreement and disagreement as brought out in the Subcommittee preparatory to paragraph-by-paragraph discussion of the 3-power text. The United States, according to a spokesman for the delegation in Paris, hopes the Committee will proceed rapidly to act on the 3-power proposal, which has now been revised (slightly) to take account of agreements reached in the Subcommittee.

*Ad Hoc Political Committee*—Representatives of the Western zones of Germany and the western sections of Berlin welcomed the U.S.-U.K.-French proposal for the appointment of a United Nations Commission to determine whether conditions exist for free-all German elections, in statements before the Committee December 8. Free elections, they said, would be a decisive step toward the "pressing necessity" of unifying Germany. They rejected the Soviet zone counter-plan for inter-German talks because "those with whom we [the Federal Republic of Germany] would have to talk aren't trustees of the will of the 18 million Germans" there. Three days later, representatives of the



Eastern zone, who had also accepted the Committee's invitation to be heard, flatly rejected the 3-power proposal, insisting that the holding of free elections was a matter for the German people alone.

*Committee II (Economic and Financial)*—A comprehensive U.S. resolution setting forth detailed financial and organizational arrangements for the continuation in 1952 of the United Nations' Expanded Program of Technical Assistance was approved by the Committee December 6 by a vote of 34-0-10 (Soviet bloc, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Burma, Indonesia). The resolution sets up machinery for the collection from governments of the "extra-budgetary" funds required to finance the \$20,000,000 1952 program.

Detailed consideration of the question of financing economic development opened December 7, with discussion centering on proposals, sponsored by groups of underdeveloped countries, to have the Economic and Social Council draw up plans for an international development fund (to make loans and grants to underdeveloped countries) and an international development authority (to assist underdeveloped countries in preparing their programs, etc.).

The United States and other industrialized countries, as well as a few underdeveloped countries, held that it would be premature and/or unrealistic to make plans for a development fund or authority at this time. They preferred a Greek-Brazil resolution requesting the Economic and Social Council to continue its studies with particular reference to the financing of non-self-liquidating projects "through existing institutions."

*Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural)*—The Committee continued general discussion of the Human Rights Covenant. So far, 19 nations have spoken in support of including economic and social rights in the same covenant with civil and political rights, while 14 countries, including the United States, have expressed a preference for two covenants.

*Committee IV (Trusteeship)*—United States Representative Francis Sayre stressed the necessity of further progress in the economic, social, and educational fields if the United Nations Trust Territories are to attain real freedom, as the Committee began discussion of the report of the Trusteeship Council December 6. "The old conception of colonialism is dead or dying fast," he pointed out, adding "The great challenge to our world of today is how to bring modern technological and expert and financial assistance to the aid of underdeveloped peoples in the building of the necessary foundations for human progress and freedom."

Two resolutions relating to the question of

South West Africa were approved by the Committee December 11 at the conclusion of a 3-day debate. Approval 39-5 (Soviet bloc)-8 (U.K.) was given to a draft cosponsored by the United States and seven other countries "solemnly" appealing to the Union of South Africa to reconsider its position and to resume negotiations with the (reconstituted) *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa for the purpose of concluding an agreement providing for the full implementation of the International Court of Justice's July 11, 1950, advisory opinion. In its opinion, the Court stated *inter alia* that South Africa, acting alone, did not have competence to modify the international status of the former mandated territory, and that it continued to have international obligations *vis-à-vis* the territory, including the obligation to submit annual reports and petitions to the United Nations. The other resolution, approved 33-0-17 (U.S.) reasserted the Assembly's position that "the normal way of modifying the international status of the territory would be to place it under the International Trusteeship System."

*Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary)*—A United States proposal which would have had the effect of reducing the United States' 1952 contribution to the United Nations budget to 33 $\frac{1}{3}$  percent was rejected by the Committee December 12 by a vote of 29 to 2 (U.S., Nicaragua) with 20 abstentions. Instead, the Committee adopted 44-5 (Soviet bloc)-3 (U.S., Sweden, Israel) an amended Syrian-United Kingdom resolution approving the scale of assessments for 1952 as recommended by the Contributions Committee and requesting that Committee to review its recommendations next year on the basis of previously established criteria "with particular attention to countries with low per capita income." Under the new scale, the United States will be called on to pay 36.90 percent of the 1952 budget, as compared with 38.92 percent for the previous year.

A previous session of the Assembly had agreed that "in normal times no one member State should contribute more than one-third of the ordinary expenses of the United Nations for any one year." In urging the Committee to put this ceiling into effect "now" as a "symbol of the teamwork and cooperation between large and small nations each with a single vote," United States Representative John Martin Vorys said, in part: "This question is an eminently political one. It is not a matter of mathematics but of high public policy. . . . I believe adopting it now would be helpful to the future support of all United Nations activities."

A Soviet resolution aimed at cutting back the considerable increases recommended in the Soviet bloc assessments was also defeated 28 (U.S.)-6-13.

**Asia**

- CHINA:** Withdrawal of further trade concessions on exports to U.S. . . . . 977
- JAPAN:** Meetings to be held with Japanese officials by Dulles . . . . . 977
- Search for a bond of fellowship between the Free East and Free West (Dulles) . . . . . 973

**Europe**

- FRANCE:** Observations and submissions to Court on rights of American nationals in Morocco . . . . . 978
- TURKEY:** McGhee appointed ambassador to . . . . . 1000
- U.S.S.R.:** Discussion of tensions with Yugoslavia . . . . . 985
- YUGOSLAVIA:** Discussion of tensions with U.S.S.R. (Cooper) . . . . . 985

**Foreign Service**

- APPOINTMENT:** McGhee as ambassador to Turkey . . . . . 1000
- Science staffs, activities (Rudolph) . . . . . 967

**International Meetings**

- Fao conference before, on agrarian reform (Hope) . . . . . 998

**Mutual Aid and Defense**

- Meetings to be held with Japanese officials by Dulles . . . . . 977

**Presidential Documents**

- PROCLAMATION:** Withdrawal of further trade concessions on Chinese imports . . . . . 977

**Protection of U. S. Nationals and Property**

- France presents observations and submissions on rights of American nationals in Morocco to International Court . . . . . 978

**Publications**

- Recent Releases . . . . . 984

**State, Department of**

- Appointment of officers . . . . . 1000
- Science adviser, office of, background (Rudolph) . . . . . 967

**Technical Cooperation and Development**

- Land reform, U.S. recommendations for Fao program (Hope) . . . . . 998
- Underdeveloped areas, advances in assisting (Mansfield) . . . . . 989
- Underdeveloped countries, U.S. draft resolution on aid to (U.N. doc. A/C.2) . . . . . 995
- U.S. proposes U.N. conference on aid to underdeveloped areas . . . . . 994

**Trade**

- GATT:** Withdrawal of further trade concessions on Chinese exports to U.S. . . . . 977

**Treaties and Other International Agreements**

- Meetings to be held with Japanese officials by Dulles . . . . . 977

**United Nations**

- Discussion of tension, Yugoslavia-U.S.S.R. . . . . 985
- GENERAL ASSEMBLY:** Underdeveloped countries, U.S. draft resolution on aid to . . . . . 995
- U.S. in U.N. (weekly summary) . . . . . 1002
- U.S. proposes conference on aid to underdeveloped areas (Mansfield) . . . . . 994

**Name Index**

- Allison, John M. . . . . 1000
- Dulles, John Foster . . . . . 973, 977
- Cooper, John Sherman . . . . . 985
- Hope, Clifford R. . . . . 998
- Johnson, U. Alexis . . . . . 1000
- Mansfield, Mike J. . . . . 989, 994
- McGhee George C. . . . . 1000
- Merchant, Livingston T. . . . . 1000
- Rudolph, Walter . . . . . 967